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I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

Corporations, especially multinational enterprises (“MNEs”), have become ever
larger and more powerful since the 1970s,1 often surpassing the economic power and
influence of states. Thanks to the development of modern communication technologies
and the freer movement of goods and services through trade, corporations have also
become more mobile and are now able to move capital and business to wherever
conditions are most favorable. Because of high production and labor costs in
industrialized countries, global competition, and the constant need to explore new
markets, many corporations are now driven to developing countries.
Corporations often bring significant benefits to the states where they operate; by
generating tax revenues, creating jobs, transferring skills and technologies and generally
raising the standards of living, they often make a positive contribution to the development
of a country.2 However, they may also cause human rights problems. Developing
countries are often clamoring for foreign direct investment (“FDI”) and will compete to
attract corporations by offering them attractive investment terms. Thus, they may be
tempted to lower working and environmental standards in hopes of attracting MNEs in
search of ever-lower production costs.3 Developing countries may also lack the adequate
means and resources to enforce existing standards.4 Some MNEs or their suppliers may
take advantage of the resulting lack of enforceable regulations, leading to poor working
conditions, restrictions on freedom of association and collective bargaining, and possibly
child labor. Moreover, in some cases, local governments commit human rights abuses
with the explicit or tacit support of corporations. This situation raises two questions:
First, how can human rights violations by corporations be avoided and redressed?
Second, how can corporations’ positive contributions to the countries where they operate
be increased?
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1
Philip Alston, The ‘Not-A-cat’ Syndrome: Can the International Human Rights Regime Accommodate
Non-State Actors?, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 17 (Philip Alston ed., Oxford University
Press 2005).
2
See, e.g., Sean D. Murphy, Taking Multinational Corporate Codes of Conduct to the Next Level, in 43
COLUM. J.TRANSNAT’L L. 389, 397 (2004-2005); Menno T. Kamminga, Holding Multinational
Corporations Accountable for Human Rights Abuses: A Challenge for the EC, in THE EU AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 553, 554 (Philip Alston ed., Oxford University Press 1999).
3
Murphy, supra note 2, at 389-99.
4
Id.
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The current state of international law regarding the position of MNEs is strikingly
unbalanced. International law still focuses too much on protecting the rights of
corporations (especially through international rules on trade and the protection of FDI)
and lags far behind in regulating their responsibilities. It is telling, for instance, that the
statutes of the relevant international criminal tribunals remain silent on the question of
criminal responsibility of corporate entities for their involvement in international crimes
like war crimes and crimes against humanity. International human rights instruments are
also notoriously silent about such responsibilities. In Europe today, the European
Convention on Human Rights is seen more as an instrument that provides rights for
corporations rather than one that lays down obligations for them, unless they are vested
with state powers and/or are controlled by the state.5
In the absence of hard law, there has been a marked tendency to use soft norms
when addressing corporate human rights responsibility. Soft norms, like those embodied
in the United Nations (“UN”) Global Compact to the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) Guidelines on Multinational Corporations, the
International Labour Organization’s (“ILO’s”) Tripartite Declaration of Principles
Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, and corporate codes of conduct,
are all deliberately kept legally non-binding. Follow-up mechanisms, if they exist, are
aimed at dialogue rather than confrontation.
Against this backdrop, the European Union (“EU”) has an important role to play in
ensuring that its corporations respect and protect human rights wherever they operate.
Since human rights are core principles of the EU,6 it has a special responsibility to ensure
that they are protected. The EU has addressed the issue of corporate human rights
responsibilities as part of its corporate social responsibility (“CSR”) policy developed in
the last decade. The purpose of this article is to assess the effectiveness of Europe’s CSR
policy with regard to human rights.
This article is divided into four parts. In Part II of this article, we will search for
the most appropriate framework capable of ensuring that corporations effectively take up
the duty to uphold human rights and live up to that duty. We start from the assumption
that corporations do indeed have the duty to behave responsibly towards a variety of
stakeholders. In an attempt to move beyond the traditional divide between voluntary and
regulatory approaches, we will argue that a mixed framework is needed. Indeed, the
‘business case’ for corporate responsibility -- that the profit-motive will encourage
socially responsible business -- is not in itself able to guarantee responsible corporate
behavior in all circumstances. Mere reliance on the law, however, will not suffice either.
Therefore, public authorities should create a framework which maximizes the benefits of
social responsibility for corporations. At the same time, however, regulatory measures
must be provided to address the worst cases of human rights violations. In Part III we
will use the framework set out in Part II to evaluate the EU’s CSR policy and practice.
We will first discuss the EU’s CSR policy and discuss whether it follows the mixed
approach we have advocated in Part II. Thereafter, we will assess to what extent the EU,
and its Member States, have developed an appropriate regulatory framework for CSR.
5

See generally MARIUS EMBERLAND, THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF COMPANIES: EXPLORING THE STRUCTURE OF
ECHR PROTECTION (Oxford University Press, 2006).
6
Treaty on European Union art. 6, para. 1, Dec. 29, 2006, 2006 O.J. (C 321 E ) 5 [hereinafter EU Treaty].
(“The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States.”).
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We will argue that the European Commission, which is the motor of the EU’s CSR
policy, despite having high ambitions at the outset, subsequently settled for an
unsatisfactory voluntary approach to CSR. Finally, in Part IV, we will make
recommendations on what steps should be taken to achieve the mixed CSR-framework
that would best ensure corporate human rights compliance in the EU. In practice, the EU
and its Member States have put in place some elements of a mixed CSR-framework, but
they leave much to be desired.
II. IN SEARCH OF A CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS RESPONSIBILITY FRAMEWORK
¶7

Milton Friedman’s vision that the one and only social responsibility of business is
to use its resources to engage in activities designed to increase its profits7 is an archaic
notion. Society now expects corporations to behave responsibly with regard to a wide
range of stakeholders, including shareholders, consumers, workers, persons living in the
vicinity of its operations, and even the wider community and the environment. Society’s
expectations are reflected in academic literature which argues that there is an evolution in
international law towards the recognition of direct responsibility of corporations for
human rights compliance.8 The aim of this article, however, is not to delineate the
substantive human rights obligations of corporations under current or future international
law. We will discuss neither their material content -- the kind of rights which
corporations are obliged to protect and whether those are only negative or also positive
rights -- nor the degree of involvement in the violations required for a company to be
liable.9 Rather, we start from the assumptions that corporations have at least an ethical
and moral duty to behave responsibly towards their stakeholders and that they may incur
criminal or civil liability for grave human rights violations. Taking these concerns as a
starting point, we search for the most efficient framework for ensuring such corporate
human rights responsibility.
A. The Choice Between a Regulatory or Voluntary Approach

¶8

At the heart of the current debate about corporate responsibility lies the question of
whether a regulatory or voluntary approach is more appropriate for ensuring corporate
human rights, social and environmental responsibilities. NGOs and civil society, together
with a significant number of academics are in favor of the former, while business
typically prefers the latter. The proponents of a regulatory approach argue that corporate
human rights responsibilities are too important an issue to be left completely in the hands
7

See Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,
Sep. 13, 1970, at 122-26 (quoted in Aaron A. Dhir, Realigning the Corporate Building Blocks: Shareholder
Proposals as a Vehicle for Achieving Corporate Social and Human Rights Accountability, 43 AM. BUS. L.
J. 365, 365 n.4 (2006)).
8
See, e.g. NICOLA JÄGERS, CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS: IN SEARCH OF ACCOUNTABILITY,
(Intersentia 2002); ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE ACTORS 195-270
(Oxford University Press 2006).
9
On the debate on corporate complicity and the margins of a company’s responsibility, see, e.g., THE
GLOBAL COMPACT, THE UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT: ADVANCING CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP,
(2005), http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/about_the_gc/2.0.2.pdf (last visited Apr. 21, 2008) (for use
of the concept of “spheres of influence”); see also INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS, BEYOND
VOLUNTARISM: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE DEVELOPING INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATIONS OF
COMPANIES 121-141 (2002) (discussing different degrees of ‘complicity’ in human rights violations).
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of corporations.10 They feel that the immense economic power that corporations have
acquired should be accompanied by corresponding responsibilities.11 Moreover, as
corporations have been accorded important rights, including under investment law and
even under human rights law,12 proponents of the regulatory approach claim that there is
no reason why they should not bear duties as well.13
Proponents of a voluntary approach, in contrast, argue that there is no need for
regulatory intervention since the market itself steers corporations towards responsible
behavior.14 According to the ‘business case’ on CSR, responsible business behavior is
also good economic behavior, since it leads to an increase in profitability.15 Thus,
responsible corporate behavior within a voluntary framework is argued to be a win-win
situation for business and society, while regulatory interference would put unnecessary
burdens on business without providing any additional benefit.
B. A Hybrid Framework: The Need to Move Beyond a Choice Between a Voluntary or
Regulatory Approach

¶10

In line with other recent academic analysis, we would like to move the debate
beyond the black-and-white argument of voluntary versus regulatory approaches.16 In
10

See, e.g., Pall A. Davidsson, Legal Enforcement of Corporate Social Responsibility Within the EU, 8
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 529, 552 (2002) (stating that “certain aspects of CSR are so critical to human welfare
that they cannot be left to the discretion of the private sector”).
11
See generally David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human Rights
Responsibilties for Corporation at International Law, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 931, 935 (2003-2004). The authors
take the idea that the power of transnational corporations has to be accompanied by commensurate duties
under international human rights law as the starting point of their examination of the possibility of directly
regulating such corporations at the international level.
12
See generally EMBERLAND, supra note 5.
13
See, e.g., Peter Muchlinski, Corporate Social Responsibility and International Law: The Case of Human
Rights and Multinational Enterprises, in THE NEW CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY: CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW 431, 433, (Doreen McBarnet, Aurora Voiculescu & Tom Campbell, eds.,
2007).
14
For example, see the responses of business representatives to the Commission Green Paper-Promoting a
European Framework for Corporate Social Responsibility COM (2001) 366 final (July 18, 2001); see also
CSR EUROPE, CSR EUROPE’S RESPONSE TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION GREEN PAPER “FOR A EUROPEAN
FRAMEWORK ON CSR”: PROPOSALS FOR ACTION, para. 7 (DEC. 21 2001), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/soc-dial/csr/csr_responses.htm (“These [voluntary] actions are
motivated by a conviction that there is an inherent bottom line value in CSR as intelligent self interest for
corporations that also brings benefits for society”); ICSCA, GREEN PAPER ON PROMOTING A EUROPEAN
FRAMEWORK FOR CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY -ICSCA STATEMENTS 1 (Dec. 27, 2001), available
at http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/soc-dial/csr/csr_responses.htm (“Companies with this
[responsible] corporate philosophy are generally more successful and profitable than others; they benefit
from sustainability as a competitive advantage.”); WORLD BUSINESS COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: MAKING GOOD BUSINESS SENSE, 7 (Jan. 2000),
available at http://www.wbcsd.org/DocRoot/IunSPdIKvmYH5HjbN4XC/csr2000.pdf, (“For any company,
giving a high priority to CSR is no longer seen to represent an unproductive cost or resource burden, but,
increasingly, as a means of enhancing reputation and credibility among stakeholders – something on which
success or even survival may depend. Understanding and taking account of society’s expectations is quite
simply enlightened self-interest for business in today’s interdependent world.”).
15
See, e.g., DAVID VOGEL, THE MARKET FOR VIRTUE: THE POTENTIAL AND LIMITS OF CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY 16 (Brookings Institution Press 2005) (“According to the business case for CSR, firms will
increasingly behave more responsibly not because managers have become more public-spirited -- though
some may have -- but because more managers now believe that being a corporate citizen is a source of
competitive advantage.”).
16
See generally Sorcha MacLeod, Reconciling Regulatory Approaches to Corporate Social Responsibility:
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our view, it would be misleading to see the two approaches as diametrically opposed and
mutually exclusive for several reasons. In practice, legislation may take on different
roles in a continuum, from soft to hard norms. It may create several incentives for
corporations, including preferential public procurement; regulatory bodies with certain
monitoring tasks; requirements for reporting on human rights issues; or civil or criminal
remedies against non-complying corporations, among other options. Indeed, regulation
may be used to make a voluntary approach more efficient.17 Seeing regulatory and
voluntary initiatives as opposing extremes overlooks the fact that corporations already
have several legal responsibilities, for example, corporate responsibility with respect to
health and safety norms and working conditions.18
¶11
On the other hand, the creation of a regulatory framework does not mean that
voluntary initiatives are not important. Indeed, the law is only one of a range of factors
that influence corporate behavior.19 In some cases, corporations may be expected to do
more than the law literally requires and, at the very least, not take advantage of its
loopholes.20 Voluntary and regulatory approaches should therefore not be seen as
mutually exclusive, but rather as complementary.21 The question to be resolved is, then,
what particular mixture of regulatory and voluntary elements best ensures corporate
human rights responsibility.
C. An Assessment of the ‘Business Case’ of CSR
¶12

Proponents of the ‘business case’ explain that corporations are financially rewarded
for behaving responsibly in various ways. They argue that not only consumers, but also
investors and even workers, attach importance to corporations’ human rights records and
have a clear preference for responsible businesses.22 Thus, the market itself acts as an
important and sufficient incentive for corporations to take human rights into account,
since responsible behavior leads to higher profits. This assumption leads them to
conclude that a voluntary approach to corporate responsibility is sufficient. In order to
The European Union, OECD and United Nations Compared, in 13 EUROPEAN PUBLIC LAW 671 (2007);
Doreen McBarnet, Corporate Social Responsibility Beyond Law, Through Law, for Law: The New
Corporate Accountability, in THE NEW CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY: CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW, 9, (Doreen McBarnet, Aurora Voiculescu & Tom Campbell eds., 2007).
See also JENNIFER A. ZERK, MULTINATIONALS AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: LIMITATIONS
AND OPPORTUNITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW , 34-40 (Cambridge University Press 2006).
17
Cf. infra Part D.
18
See McBarnet, supra note 16, at 31.
19
ZERK, supra note 16, at 35.
20
Id. at 34.
21
Davidsson, supra note 10, at 552.
22
VOGEL, supra note 15, at 16-17. Vogel describes the benefits corporate social responsibility is supposed
to bring for business as: “A more responsibly managed firm will face fewer business risks than its less
virtuous competitors: it will be more likely to avoid consumer boycotts, be better able to obtain capital at a
lower cost, and be in a better position to attract and retain committed employees and loyal customers.
Correspondingly, firms that are unable or unwilling to recognize this new competitive reality will find
themselves disadvantaged in the marketplace: both “responsible” and “sophisticated” investors will regard
their shares as too risky; the value of their brands and thus their sales will decline as a result of media
exposure, public protests, and boycotts; and the morale of their employees will suffer.” Id. He then
assesses the existence of a business case for corporate social responsibility and the actual demand of
stakeholders for responsible corporate behavior. Id. chs 2,3. The structure of our own discussion of the
merits of the business case (no. 9 and following) draws upon this. See also McBarnet, supra note 16, at 1719.
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determine whether the ‘business case’ is a useful, sufficient and/or necessary approach to
ensuring corporate human rights responsibility, we will critically examine the available
evidence on these assumptions. Before doing so, however, we would like to put the
‘business case’ into the right perspective.
1. The ‘Business Case’ as a Means for Ensuring Responsible Corporate Behavior
¶13

When discussing the ‘business case’ for corporate responsibility, it is important to
see things from the right angle. As explained above, we start from the assumption that
corporations have human rights, social and environmental responsibilities with respect to
a wide range of stakeholders. Thus our goal is to ensure that businesses live up to these
responsibilities. The question then arises as to what would be the best means to reach
that goal; in other words what kind of framework would be the most efficient in ensuring
that corporations take up their human rights obligations. If proven correct, the ‘business
case’ for corporate responsibility could lead to the conclusion that the best means for
ensuring responsible behavior are regulatory instruments which make the ‘business case’
work, or alternatively, the ‘business case’ could be shown to work without any regulatory
intervention whatsoever. Thus the ‘business case’ for corporate responsibility may
inform us as to the means needed for ensuring responsibility. The idea that good
responsible behavior leads to increased profits may be a good incentive for corporations
to act responsibly, but it should never be seen as the ultimate reason for responsible
behavior.23 Corporations have to behave responsibly because it is their duty to do so, not
because it helps them to make more profits.24 Indeed, if respect for human rights is
fundamental to our society, whether or not ensuring such respect would bring economic
advantages is irrelevant; achieving it remains our final goal. Therefore, if corporate
social responsibility were not economically profitable, as proponents of the ‘business
case’ for corporate responsibility claim, we would have to look for other means to reach
our goal, not simply drop the goal because of the inherent conflict. It is important to keep
this perspective in mind when reflecting on the EU’s approach to corporate
responsibilities, where it is sometimes hard to distinguish goals from means.
2. The Impact of Socially Conscious Consumerism on Corporate Behavior

¶14

With this perspective in mind, we will now assess the merits of the ‘business
case.’25 First, proponents of the ‘business case’ base their argument on the premise that
consumers take corporations’ human rights records into consideration. A company with
a positive human rights image would therefore be rewarded by consumers, and
conversely, a company known to violate human rights would suffer from consumer
avoidance and possibly even boycotts.26 Indeed, research has shown that consumers
claim to take a corporation’s human rights record into account and that consumers are
willing to pay more for ethically produced goods.27 A 1997 survey found that seventy23

See Doreen McBarnet, supra note 16, at 24-25.
See Davidsson, supra note 10, at 532.
25
See VOGEL, supra note 15, at 46-74. The structure of our assessment of stakeholders’ demand for
responsible behavior is based on Vogel’s model. It also provided the basis for our substantive analysis.
26
See id. at 47-56 (assessing the influence of consumers on corporate behavior).
27
See, e.g., id. at 47.
24
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one percent of French consumers would choose a ‘child-labor-free’ product even if it
were more expensive than the alternatives.28 Other surveys show that more than 30% of
UK customers claimed to have boycotted stores because of ethical concerns and that 60%
said to be prepared to participate in a boycott in the future.29
¶15
There is a discrepancy, however, between what consumers say and what they
actually do.30 In practice, only a small minority of consumers take social considerations
into account when shopping.31 It is true that the segment of consumers who base
decisions on corporate responsibility is growing, evidenced by the fact that consumer
awareness in the UK of the Fair Trade Brand doubled to 50% between 2003 and 2005,
and sales of all Fair Trade Products increased by 51% between 2003 and 2004.32
Nonetheless, the impact of socially conscious consumerism on business profits still
appears to be limited.
¶16
The question then arises how the impact of socially conscious consumerism can be
increased. One reason consumers might not take human rights considerations into
account when shopping may be that they lack adequate information about the responsible
or irresponsible behavior of corporations.33 Most products do not contain any
information about the conditions of their production, and if products do have a certain
label, consumers may not know its exact meaning and may not trust its credibility. They
might be aware of the human rights behavior of large corporations -- and then mostly in
cases of recent scandal -- but they will hardly ever be aware of the human rights record of
lesser known brands.34 This general lack of information makes it hard for consumers to
compare different products and leaves them unable to make informed choices. To do so,
they would need easily accessible, comprehensible, and credible information about the
human rights records of corporations. There is thus a role for public authorities to create
a general regulatory framework to make the ‘business case’ for corporate human
responsibility work. Governments could require credible human rights reporting with
effective monitoring. They could also support or even create a credible social label and
28

S. GARONE, THE LINK BETWEEN CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE, CONFERENCE
BOARD, RESEARCH REPORT 1234-99-RR, 9 (quoted in VOGEL, supra note 15, at 47).
29
See VOGEL, supra note 15, at 48.
30
Id.
31
Id. (“[S]tudies suggest that the true number of socially conscious consumers may even be lower [than 10
percent].”) Vogel refers to a 2004 European survey (MICHEL CAPRON AND FRANÇOISE QUAIRELLANOIZELEE, MYTHES ET RÉALITÉS DE L’ENTREPRISE RESPONSIBLE 57 (La Decouverte 2004)), which found
that while seventy-five percent of consumers indicated that they were ready to modify their purchasing
decisions because of social or environmental criteria, only three percent had actually done so. Other studies
in Britain have reported that approximately five percent of the public strictly follows ethical concerns in
their purchasing, while “ethical boycotts” affect less than two percent of market transactions. Dara
O’Rourke, Opportunities and Obstacles for Corporate Social Responsibility in Developing Countries,
WORLD BANK/INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION 22 (March 2004). See also VOGEL, supra note 15,
at 51-52 (discussing the limited effects of consumer boycotts).
32
Between 2002 and 2005 there has been a 265% rise in Fairtrade products. A 2006 Survey by the Cooperative Bank in November 2006 put the UK ethical consumption market at £29 billion, an 11.4 per cent
rise on the previous year compared to a 1.4 per cent rise in household expenditure more generally. See
McBarnet, supra note 16, at vii.
33
See VOGEL, supra note 15, at 52. Vogel also suggests their lack of knowledge arises from lack of interest
rather than lack of available information. Id. We do not agree and believe that consumers still have no easy
access to the necessary information, so that a conclusion on their interest in the matter cannot be so easily
reached.
34
See McBarnet, supra note 16, at 26.
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adopt advertising laws to combat false or misleading social statements in advertising.
Only then would consumers be able to make informed choices, taking human rights into
account.35
3. The Impact of Socially Responsible Investment on Corporate Behavior
¶17

Investors are seen as a second category of stakeholders who influence the behavior
of corporations.36 The idea is that socially responsible investors take corporations’
human rights policies into account when deciding in which company to invest.37 Socially
responsible investment (“SRI”) is thus arguably an effective market incentive for
respecting human rights, since it may be assumed that non-responsible corporations will
find it harder to attract investors and might even see their share prices drop. Investors
may have two reasons for investing their money in a responsible way, both of which
point towards a confirmation of the ‘business case’ for responsibility. First, some
investors may decide only to invest in ‘responsible’ corporations because they feel it is
their moral duty to do so. They do not want to lend their support to corporate human
rights violations through their investment decisions. For others, SRI may simply be a
means of ensuring greater share returns. Indeed, under the ‘business case’ reasoning,
socially responsible corporations would be more profitable and SRI would make perfect
economic sense.38 However, empirical research has not been able to prove unequivocally
that SRI leads to higher profits. At best,39 the risk-adjusted returns of a carefully
constructed, socially-screened portfolio are neither better nor worse than if no social
criteria are included in stock selection.40 This means that there is a place in the market
for both responsible businesses and SRI, but an increase in responsible business behavior
or SRI is not self-evident. In practice, a socially responsible stock index was introduced
in the UK in 2001 -- the FTSE4Good Index -- which uses criteria based on CSR.
Although SRI is growing,41 it still only accounts for a very small part of the European

35

See Olivier De Schutter, The Accountability of Multinationals for Human Rights Violations in European
Law, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, 226, 227 (P. Alston ed., 2005). See also BEUC,
EUROPEAN CONSUMERS’ ORGANISATION, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: BEUC COMMENTS ON THE
GREEN PAPER, 2-3 (Feb. 6, 2002), http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/soc-dial/csr/pdf/092NGOEU_BEUC_EU_020207_en.pdf (stating its view that it is a governmental duty to create a situation
where consumers have an informed choice to buy sustainable and ethical products for a competitive price).
36
Vogel, supra note 15, at 60-72.
37
Id. at 16-17.
38
Id. at 21-23. Vogel also suggests that the second group of investors, compared to the first group, is
becoming increasingly important, compared to the first group. Id.
39
Since their inception, two major ethical stock indexes, the FTSE4Good Index and the Dow Jones
Sustainability Index have underperformed the market by 3% and 8% respectively. Id. at 35-36.
40
Id. at 37. See also Kevin Campbell & Douglas Vick, Disclosure Law and the Market for Corporate
Social Responsibility, in THE NEW CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY supra note 13 at 277 ( “Previous
empirical studies of the comparative performance of ‘ethical’ and ‘non-ethical’ corporations did not
provide clear evidence that CSR improved a company’s value in the stock market, but they did not clearly
indicate that CSR activities hurt performance, either”). Their own empirical study leads to similar
equivocal results, which are, however, not encouraging in the sense that socially responsible corporations
performed worse than other corporations during bad market times.
41
See McBarnet, supra note 16, at 18 (“SRI investment in France rose 76 per cent in 2004, with 60 per cent
of that accounted for by institutional investors.” (quoting Ethical Corporation, Business Briefs, ETHICAL
CORPORATION, Sept. 2005, at 4).
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stock market,42 meaning that it is unable to affect share values.43 Nevertheless, in some
cases SRI may have some influence on corporate policies through shareholder activism.44
¶18
All in all, the ‘business case’ for corporate responsibility based on investor
preferences seems to be weak as the market share of SRI is still very low. It could be
improved by putting an enabling framework into place that provides investors with easily
accessible and credible information on corporations’ human rights policies. The actual
influence of SRI on corporate policies, however, could remain weak; to have a significant
effect on shareholder value, the uptake of SRI must dramatically increase.45 Admittedly,
shareholder activism may have some influence, but it seems insufficient to have a real
influence in most cases.
4. The Impact of Workers on Corporate Behavior
¶19

A third category of stakeholders who could make corporations act in a more
responsible way are workers.46 The idea is that the brightest and best people will not
want to work for a company with a bad human rights record. However, this idea falls
short. On one hand, research has shown that ninety-two percent of UK employees
considered it important that their employers be socially responsible and sixty percent said
they felt strongly about it.47 Some firms are indeed more attractive to some employees
because of their social reputation.48 On the other hand, it has not been proven that the
labor market provides incentives for all corporations to behave responsibly and there is
no evidence that firms without strong reputations for social responsibility find it difficult
to attract first-rate, highly committed employees. In the end, having a strong reputation
for responsible corporate behavior is only one of the many ways of making a firm a
desirable place to work.49 Nevertheless, employees may sometimes pressure a company
to behave more responsibly.50
5. The ‘Business Case’ Does Not Suffice

¶20

Having reviewed the empirical evidence, it does not seem self-evident that
responsible behavior is indeed good for business or conversely that irresponsible
behavior is bad for profits. Behaving responsibly may be beneficial for some
corporations in some situations whose marketing strategy is built entirely on their social
reputation.51 Similarly, irresponsible behavior may be costly for well-known brands,
since they may be easily targeted by media campaigns.52 However, it has not been
42

Approximately 0.36%. See VOGEL, supra note 15, at 61.
Id. at 62-63.
44
Id. at 64-65. See also McBarnet, supra note 16, at 37-38 (stating that NGOs, for instance, have bought
shares in order to be able to exercise shareholder rights at annual general meetings.)
45
See VOGEL, supra note 15, at 62-64 (according to one model SRI should occupy at least 25% of the
market to be able to have an influence on share prices).
46
, See id. at 56-60 (providing an assessment of the influence of employees on corporate behavior).
47
McBarnet, supra note 16, at 19.
48
VOGEL, supra note 15, at 58.
49
Id. at 58-59.
50
See id. at 59-60.
51
Id. at 50-51.
52
Id. at 29-33.
43
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proven that corporate responsibility will generally make a company more profitable.
Thus, “the market for virtue is not sufficiently important to make it in the interest of all
firms to behave more responsibly”53 and an appropriate regulatory framework is needed.
D. A Hybrid Framework is Necessary to Make the ‘Business Case’ Work and Address Its
Failures
¶21

An important factor in the failure of the ‘business case’ for corporate human rights
responsibility is the absence of an appropriate framework to make it work. In order to
improve the ‘business case’ for corporate responsibility, public authorities should put
such an enabling framework in place. In quite the same way that market efficiencies can
only be assured if public authorities ensure fair competition, it may very well be that
responsible corporate behavior will only be rewarded if the right framework is in place.
As already mentioned, a first role for public authorities is to ensure that consumers,
investors and workers alike have access to clear and credible information on the behavior
of corporations so that they are able to make informed decisions. Thus, reporting on nonfinancial issues according to certain guidelines could be made mandatory, verification of
social claims should be ensured, and monitoring of code of conducts must be put in
place.54 In addition, misleading advertising laws should be adopted to combat false social
claims. Apart from that, public authorities can also influence the behavior of
corporations through their role as economic actors, especially through public
procurement decisions. Ironically, business representatives who favor the ‘business case’
are opposed to the implementation of such a framework designed to make the ‘business
case’ work, which raises doubts about their true belief in such a ‘business case’. Indeed,
“[i]f voluntary adherence to CSR standards is ‘good for business,’ what do business
entities have to fear from legally-binding obligations to respect human rights and
environmental standards?”55
¶22
Even with an appropriate enabling framework in place, however, not all
corporations would gain from behaving responsibly. If the choice is left to business, with
shareholder value as the only justification for responsible -- or irresponsible -- behavior,
it cannot be assumed that responsible behavior will always win out in a conflict of
demands. In some cases the immediate gains from violating human rights or exploiting
weak laws in developing countries may be larger than their potential costs. Admittedly,
the more responsible option may be beneficial for the long-term reputational interests of a
company, but even then corporations may prefer short-term profits and/or taking
advantage of limited business opportunities.56
53

Id. at 17, 29-34.
See, e.g., Davidsson, supra note 10, at 552-553. Note that a variety of regulatory techniques may be used
to achieve these objectives. While it is crucial that public authorities make sure all necessary mechanisms
are put in place, they do not necessarily need to provide all of them themselves and may delegate some to
the private sector.
55
Sorcha MacLeod, Corporate Social Responsibility Within the European Union Framework, 23 WIS.
INT’L L.J. 541, 551 (2005).
56
See, e.g., De Schutter, supra note 35, at 227 (“With respect to many socially responsible practices,
companies will frequently find themselves in the familiar situation where what would be profitable in the
long run if other competitors act similarly will be costly in the short run, where certain competitors seeking
an immediate return on the investment of the shareholders, will act otherwise.”). See also McBarnet, supra
note 16, at 25; THE PLATFORM OF EUROPEAN SOCIAL NGOS: SOCIAL PLATFORM RESPONSE TO THE
COMMISSION’S GREEN PAPER, II.1 (Nov. 26 2001) [hereinafter EUROPEAN SOCIAL NGOS], available at
54

271

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS

[2008

¶23

This leads us to the conclusion that the ‘business case’ for corporate human rights
responsibility is a useful, but not sufficient, means for attaining our goal of ensuring
responsible corporate activity. Accordingly, corporate human rights responsibility cannot
be left to the market alone.57 Effective state action is necessary to ensure that grave
human rights violations by business are not tolerated, whether they happen in the
corporation’s home or host state. Such violations must be redressed and victims must
receive reparations. There is thus a need for civil and criminal procedures to address
serious violations of human rights.
¶24
The fact that legally enforceable remedies are needed does not mean that voluntary
initiatives lack value. If we want corporations to truly behave responsibly, it is important
that they not only comply with the letter, but also with the spirit, of the law.58 As Mary
Robinson, former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, has aptly pointed out:
“Regulation is crucial to minimize abuses and to enforce compliance with minimum
norms but it alone will not establish the ‘business case’ for making the necessary
changes. To do so we must provide incentives, so that doing the right thing also makes
good business sense.”59
III. THE EUROPEAN UNION’S CSR POLICY: AN APPROPRIATE APPROACH TO CORPORATE
HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS?
¶25

In the previous part, we argued that a hybrid framework is needed to ensure
responsible corporate behavior. Such a framework will have to consist of enabling
elements which help to make the ‘business case’ work as well as an effective sanctions
mechanism to address failures of the ‘business case’ that may still occur in spite of the
preventive framework.
¶26
In this part we will assess to what extent the EU’s CSR policy intends to establish
such a hybrid framework for CSR. We will discuss the European Commission’s Green
Paper on CSR of 2001 which is the real starting point of the EU’s CSR policy (section
A), its follow-up Communication of 2002 which launched the EU Multi-Stakeholder
Forum (section B) and the activities and outcome of the Forum (section C). The Forum’s
conclusions, together with the review of the Lisbon Strategy in 2005, which emphasized
the importance of growth and jobs (section D) have shaped the Commission’s current -purely voluntary -- approach to CSR (section E). Its approach can be contrasted with the
one of the European Parliament, which is in favor of a mixed approach to CSR, which in
our view would be more desirable (section F). In spite of the European Commission’s
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/soc-dial/csr/pdf/092-NGOEU_Platform-of-European-SocialNGOs_EU_011126_en.htm, (“all actors need to acknowledge that short-term profit and social
responsibility are not always reconcilable”); Davidsson, supra note 10, at 532 (“Additional costs are
involved in adopting new policies and schemes to align existing company practices with social
responsibilities, and these additional costs will not always result in increased profits. Even where
consumers or investors reward ethical conduct, practices that are socially harmful could be even more
profitable.”).
57
See, e.g. Davidsson, supra note 10, 552 (“Certain aspects of CSR are so critical to human welfare that
they cannot be left to the discretion of the private sector.”).
58
See McBarnet, supra note 16, at 47-54 (on the need to comply with the spirit of the law and the problem
of ‘creative compliance’).
59
MacLeod, supra note 55, at 551 (quoting Mary Robinson, United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights, RSA World Leaders Lecture: Beyond Good Intentions: Corporate Citizenship For a New
Century (May 2002)).
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early ambitions to put a basic enabling regulatory framework into place, and consistent
calls from the European Parliament and NGOs for regulatory measures, the voice of
business has prevailed, resulting in a purely voluntary approach to CSR (section G).
A. The Starting Point for the EU’s Corporate Social Responsibility Policy: the European
Commission’s Green Paper on CSR of 2001
¶27

Although there had been some earlier initiatives,60 the real starting point for the
EU’s CSR policy was the issuing of the European Commission’s (“Commission”) Green
Paper on the promotion of a European framework for corporate social responsibility
(“Green Paper”) in 2001.61 Following the tradition of EU Green Papers, it aims to
“launch a wide debate and seek views on corporate social responsibility at a national,
European and international level.”62 The Green Paper defines CSR as “a concept
whereby corporations integrate social and environmental concerns in their business
operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis,”63 but
makes it clear that CSR should not be seen as a substitute for regulation or legislation
concerning social rights or environmental standards, including the development of new
appropriate legislation. On the specific issue of human rights, the Commission notes that
“binding rules ensure minimum standards applicable to all, while codes of conduct and
other voluntary initiatives can only complement these and promote higher standards for
those who subscribe to them.”64 Although CSR itself is seen as something voluntary, the
Commission clearly envisages an active role for public authorities:65
[The] main contribution of a European approach [would] be to
complement and add value to existing activities by providing an overall
European framework, aiming at promoting quality and coherence of
corporate social responsibility practices, through developing broad
principles, approaches and tools, and promoting best practice and
innovative ideas, [and by] supporting best practice approaches to costeffective evaluation and independent verification of corporate social
responsibility practices, ensuring thereby their effectiveness and
credibility.66
Nevertheless, it is clear that the ‘business case’ for CSR lies at the base of the
Commission’s approach. The Commission believes that socially and environmentally
60

See, e.g., Commission Communication on Multinational Undertakings and Community Regulations,
COM (73) 1930 final (Nov. 7, 1973); see also MacLeod, supra note 55, at 543; Parliament Resolution on
EU Standards for European Enterprises Operating in Developing Countries: Towards a European Code of
Conduct of April 14, 1999, 1999 O.J. (C 104/180).
61
Commission Green Paper on Promoting a European Framework for Corporate Social Responsibility,
COM (2001) 366 final (July 18, 2001) [hereinafter Commission Green Paper on CSR].
62
Id. at 7.
63
Id. at 8. See also Commisson Communication on Promoting Core Labour Standards and Improving
Social Governance in the Context of Globalization, COM (2001) 416 final (July 18, 2001) (confirming the
Commission’s view that CSR initiatives are of a voluntary nature).
64
Commission Green Paper on CSR, supra note 61, at 15.
65
Olivier De Schutter, Corporate Social Responsibility European Style, 2 EUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL 203,
207 (2008).
66
Commission Green Paper on CSR, supra note 61, at 7.
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positive behavior “can result in better performance and can generate more profits and
growth,”67 acknowledging, however, the “need for better knowledge and further studies
on the impact of corporate social responsibility on business performance.”68 All in all,
the underlying rationale of the Commission seems to be that there is a ‘business case’ for
CSR, but that public authorities should create the necessary framework conditions to
make this ‘business case’ work.
¶28
In the Commission’s vision, responsible corporate behavior should be promoted by
enabling consumers and investors alike to take a corporation’s human rights, social and
environmental record into account. It sees an important role for the EU in establishing
the necessary means for providing consumers and investors with reliable information to
allow them to make informed decisions. More concretely, the Commission addresses the
importance of social responsibility reporting, the monitoring and verification of CSR
practices,69 and suggests the creation of a public social label.70 As regards SRI, it points
out the need for further standardization, harmonization and transparency in screening
tools and metrics used by screening agencies.71 In addition, public authorities would have
a direct role to play by “support[ing] education and awareness-raising around labor
conditions issues, promot[ing] best practice through sponsorship of company awards,
facilitat[ing] . . . the development of multi-stakeholder partnerships, develop[ing] . . .
standards in social labeling, and us[ing] . . . public procurement and fiscal incentives in
promoting labeled products”.72
¶29
The Green Paper succeeded in its aim to launch a wide debate and received a large
number of reactions from different stakeholders and public authorities.73 On some issues,
especially the role of public authorities in providing a regulatory framework for CSR,
different stakeholders have taken diametrically opposed views. NGOs emphasize that a
purely voluntary approach to CSR would be insufficient and that voluntary commitments
should not be seen as a substitute to regulation or legislation.74 Instead, they propose a
67

Id. at 8 (“The economic impact of corporate social responsibility can be broken down into direct and
indirect effects. Positive direct results may, for example, derive from a better working environment, which
leads to a more committed and productive workforce or from efficient use of natural resources. In addition,
indirect effects result from the growing attention of consumers and investors, which will increase their
opportunities on the markets. Inversely, there can sometimes be a negative impact on a company's
reputation due to criticism of business practices. This can affect the core assets of a company, such as its
brands and image”). See also id. at 9 (“Financial institutions are making increasing use of social and
environmental checklists to evaluate the risks of loans to, and investments in companies. Similarly, being
recognized as a socially responsible enterprise, for example, through listing in an ethical stock market
index, can support the rating of a company and therefore entails concrete financial advantages”).
68
Id. at 9.
69
Id. at 18-19.
70
Id. at 21.
71
Id. at 22.
72
Id. at 21.
73
All responses to the consultation on the Commission Green Paper on CSR are available at
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/soc-dial/csr/csr_responses.htm.
74
See, e.g., E-mail from Dr. Allen White, Director, Global Reporting Initiative, in response to the call by
the European Commission for input to the discussion opened by the recent Green Paper on Promoting a
European Framework for Corporate Social Responsibility, supra note 61; CLEAN CLOTHES CAMPAIGN,
REACTION FROM THE CLEAN CLOTHES CAMPAIGN TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION GREEN PAPER
“PROMOTING A EUROPEAN FRAMEWORK FOR CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY” (Dec. 21, 2001)
[hereinafter CLEAN CLOTHES CAMPAIGN] http://www.cleanclothes.org/news/01-12-21.htm; EUROPEAN
SOCIAL NGOS, supra note 56, paras. I.15, 1.16; OXFAM INTERNATIONAL, THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S
GREEN PAPER: PROMOTING A EUROPEAN FRAMEWORK FOR CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: A
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mixture of voluntary and regulatory instruments.75 Business and employers’
organizations agree with the Commission’s definition that CSR involves actions that go
beyond regulatory compliance.76 They clearly favor a voluntary approach to CSR, which
they see as a more efficient way to promote good corporate practices than prescriptive
governmental codes and regulations.77 Emphasizing the inappropriateness of “a one-sizefits-all” approach,78 they stress the need for flexibility79 which could best be addressed by
voluntary initiatives.80 Moreover, they claim, regulatory initiatives would also be
unnecessary because of the high standards of existing regulations.81 According to some
organizations, the only role for public authorities is to encourage voluntary corporate
initiatives and to promote best corporate practices.82 CSR Europe,83 however, sees scope
for regulation on specific matters of widespread social concern such as health and safety
or exploitative employment.84 It also supports CSR-enabling legislation, citing the
examples of disclosure regulations in the UK, France and Germany.85

SUBMISSION BY OXFAM INTERNATIONAL, para 16 (Jan. 2002), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/soc-dial/csr/pdf/091-NGOINT_OXFAM_INT_020121_en.pdf,
[hereinafter OXFAM INTERNATIONAL]; TRAIDCRAFT EXCHANGE, EU CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
GREEN PAPER: SUBMISSION BY TRAIDCRAFT EXCHANGE, 2 (Dec. 2001), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/soc-dial/csr/pdf/091-NGOINT_Traidcraft_INT_011221_en.pdf,
[hereinafter TRAIDCRAFT EXCHANGE]; but see Letter from Chris Wille, Director, Rainforest Alliance, to the
European Commission (Dec. 28, 2001) (stating that “CSR and certification are voluntary systems and
should be market driven, otherwise they will not succeed in the long term”).
75
See, e.g., OXFAM INTERNATIONAL, supra note 74, para. 19; TRAIDCRAFT EXCHANGE, supra note 74;
CLEAN CLOTHES CAMPAIGN, supra note 74.
76
CSR EUROPE, CSR EUROPE’S RESPONSE TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION GREEN PAPER “FOR A
EUROPEAN FRAMEWORK ON CSR”: PROPOSALS FOR ACTION, para. 7 (Dec. 21 2001), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/soc-dial/csr/pdf/043COMPNETEU_CSREUROPE_EU_011221_en.pdf, [hereinafter CSR EUROPE]; see also id. at para. 15 ("It
is illogical to speak of regulating CSR activities, if they are simultaneously to be encouraged as activities
that lie beyond regulation”).
77
INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE GROUP ON BUSINESS IN SOCIETY, ICC COMMENTS ON THE
EUROPEAN COMMISSION GREEN PAPER “PROMOTING A EUROPEAN FRAMEWORK FOR CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITy” (Dec. 20, 2001), available at http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/soc-dial/csr/pdf/043COMPNETEU_CSREUROPE_EU_011221_en.pdf; see also ASSOCIATION DES INDUSTRIES DE MARQUE,
AIM® POSITION PAPER: AIM REPLY TO THE GREEN PAPER ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY,
(Jan. 2002), available at http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/soc-dial/csr/pdf/043COMPNETEU_AIM_EU_020118_en.pdf; CSR Europe, supra note 76, para. 22.
78
ICSCA, GREEN PAPER ON PROMOTING A EUROPEAN FRAMEWORK FOR CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY: ICSCA STATEMENTS (Dec. 27, 2001), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/soc-dial/csr/pdf/031-ORGINT_ICSCA_INT_011227_en.pdf.
79
CSR EUROPE, supra note 76, paras. 3, 4.
80
INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ICC COMMENTS ON THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION GREEN
PAPER “PROMOTING A EUROPEAN FRAMEWORK FOR CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY” (Dec 20, 2001),
available at http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/soc-dial/csr/pdf/042-COMPNETINT_InternationalChamber-of-Commerce-ICC_INT_011220_en.pdf.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
CSR Europe is a business driven network made up of over fifty member companies and linking fifteen
national and international partner orgs around Europe, who together represent over 1200 businesses.
84
CSR EUROPE, CSR EUROPE’S RESPONSE TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION GREEN PAPER “FOR A
EUROPEAN FRAMEWORK ON CSR”: PROPOSALS FOR ACTION, para. 16, (Dec. 21 2001), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/soc-dial/csr/pdf/043COMPNETEU_CSREUROPE_EU_011221_en.pdf.
85
Id. at para. 17.
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B. The Commission’s Communication on CSR as a Business Contribution to Sustainable
Development and Launch of the EU Multi-Stakeholder Forum on CSR in 2002
¶30

After the consultation process, the Commission adopted a new Communication on
CSR as a business contribution to sustainable development in July 2002.86 The basic
policy views of the Commission do not seem to have changed since its Green Paper. It
confirms its definition of CSR and, while it expresses its belief in the ‘business case’ for
CSR, it continues to see a role for a European CSR framework to make the ‘business
case’ work.87 More concretely, it sees room for EU action aimed at improving
transparency and thus credibility of CSR practices.88
¶31
Indeed, there has been an increase in guidelines, principles and codes relating to
CSR, which cannot be easily compared,89 which causes confusion for business,
consumers, investors, other stakeholders and the public.”90 Therefore, “there is a need for
a certain convergence of concepts, instruments, practices, which would increase
transparency without stifling innovation, and would offer benefits to all parties.”91
Further, greater consensus is necessary “on the type of information to be disclosed, the
reporting format, the indicators used and the reliability of the evaluation and audit
procedure [as that] would allow for a more meaningful benchmarking and
communication of corporations' performance within particular sectors and for businesses
of similar size.” The guidelines developed by the Global Reporting Initiative (“GRI”) are
a good example which could serve as the foundation of such consensus.92 Apart from
convergence, it is also important that codes be effectively implemented, monitored and
verified,93 that social and environmental claims be made and assessed in accordance with
commonly agreed-upon criteria, and that such claims be monitored by Member States
and stakeholders.94 There is also room for an EU approach to SRI.95
¶32
In order to make progress on all these issues, the Commission launches in this
Communication an EU Multi-Stakeholder Forum (“Forum”) on CSR whose purpose is to
facilitate dialogue between business and their stakeholders. The aim of this Forum is:
to promote transparency and convergence of CSR practices and
instruments, through (1) exchange of experience and good practice
between actors at EU level, (2) bringing together existing initiatives within
the EU, and seeking to establish common EU approach and guiding
principles, including as a basis for dialogue in international fora and with

86

Commission Communication concerning Corporate Social Responsibility: a Business Contribution to
Sustainable Development, COM (2002), 347 final, (July 2, 2002).
87
Id. at 5.
88
Id. at 8.
89
Id. at 12-13
90
Id. at 8.
91
Id. at 12-13 (references omitted).
92
Id. at 14.
93
Id. at 13.
94
Id. at 15.
95
Id. at 16.
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third countries and (3) identifying and exploring areas where additional
action is needed at European level.96
The Commission invites the Forum to address and develop guiding principles on the
issues discussed above: the effectiveness and credibility of codes of conduct, the problem
of CSR measurement, reporting and assurance, labeling schemes based on the core ILO
conventions and environmental standards, and the disclosure of SRI policies on pension
and retail funds.97 In theory, it would have been possible for the Commission to develop
these guidelines itself. The reason for entrusting this task to the Forum was that the
Commission absolutely wanted “ownership” of the CSR principles by all stakeholders.
C. Activities and Outcome of the EU Multi-Stakeholder Forum on CSR
¶33

The outcome of the EU Multi-Stakeholder Forum on CSR was unfortunately far
less ambitious than it could have been. From the very start, business representatives
dominated the debate in the Forum, succeeding immediately in downgrading its mandate
when it was formally established at its first High-Level Meeting on October 16, 2002.98
According to its self-adopted mandate, the Forum was
to promote innovation, transparency and convergence of CSR practices
and instruments through improving knowledge about the relationship
between CSR and sustainable development . . . by facilitating the
exchange of experience and good practices and bringing together existing
CSR instruments and initiatives, with a special emphasis on SME specific
aspects [and by] exploring the appropriateness of establishing common
guiding principles for CSR practices and instruments, taking into account
existing EU initiatives and legislation and internationally agreed
instruments such as OECD Guidelines for multinational enterprises,
Council of Europe Social Charter, ILO core labor conventions and the
International Bill of Human Rights.99
The mandate of the platform had one crucial difference from that envisaged by the
Commission in its Communication: it lacked the objective of “identifying and exploring
areas where additional action is needed at the European level.”100 This determined the
outcome of the Forum as no proposals for legislative actions could have been proposed
by a platform that did not have a mandate to do so.101

96

Id. at 17.
Id. at 18.
98
For an interesting and revealing discussion of the establishment and early life of the Forum, see Olivier
De Schutter, Corporate Social Responsibility European Style, 14 EUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL NO. 2, 203,
210-214 (2008).
99
EU MULTI-STAKEHOLDER FORUM ON CSR, OBJECTIVES, COMPOSITION AND OPERATIONAL ASPECTS
(Oct. 16, 2002), para. 1, available at
http://circa.europa.eu/irc/empl/csr_eu_multi_stakeholder_forum/info/data/en/CSR%20Forum%20Rules.ht
m.
100
De Schutter, supra note 98, at 213.
101
Id. at 213-214.
97
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¶34

The Multi-Stakeholder Forum presented its Final Report with results and
recommendations at its last High-Level Meeting in June 2004.102 According to its
foreword, the Final Report is a “fair record of points of consensus identified during the
twenty month process and work of the Forum, [which] was presented, discussed and
agreed [subject to internal consultation led by some NGOs with their constituencies]”. It
recognizes, though, that “some differences and debates . . . remain.”103 In reality, no
consensus was reached.104 Indeed, the Final Report of the Forum represents the business
approach to CSR, presenting it as “the voluntary integration of environmental and social
considerations into business operations, over and above legal requirements and
contractual obligations. CSR is about going beyond these, not replacing or avoiding
them.”105
¶35
Not surprisingly, the recommendations made by the Final Report are very weak.
The Final Report recommends that “public authorities ensure that there is both a legal
framework and the right economic and social conditions in place to allow corporations
which wish to go further through CSR to benefit from this in the market place, both in the
EU and globally,”106 but does not explain what such a framework should look like. On
the issue of reporting and monitoring, for instance, it merely “notes that for trade unions
and NGOs, transparent CSR reporting is a particularly important process in providing
meaningful information, a clear record of CSR development and assessing credibility.”107
Since business representatives have always opposed the adoption of mandatory reporting
rules, no consensus was reached. The recommendation on the establishment of an
enabling framework for CSR thus rings hollow. Only on the issue of public procurement
is the outcome somewhat more positive, with the request for “EU and/or Member States
[to] consider and evaluate how to use public funds in the most responsible and effective
manner, taking into account environmental and social, as well as economic
considerations.”108 In sum, few of the European Commission’s and Parliament’s early
ambitions remain, and no progress has been achieved in the establishment of a regulatory
framework, which would have enabled the ‘business case’ for CSR.
D. The Lisbon Strategy and its 2005 Review
¶36

In order to understand the further evolution of the EU’s policy on CSR, it is
important to keep in mind that its CSR policy has been made a part of the “Lisbon
102

EU MULTI-STAKEHOLDER FORUM ON CSR, FINAL REPORT, (June 29, 2004), available at
http://circa.europa.eu/irc/empl/csr_eu_multi_stakeholder_forum/info/data/en/CSR%20Forum%20final%20
report.pdf, Foreword.
103
Id.
104
De Schutter, supra note 98, at 214.
105
EU MULTI-STAKEHOLDER FORUM ON CSR, supra note 102, at 2-3. Richard Howitt, member of the
European Parliament and Rapporteur on CSR has confirmed that no definition has been reached on the
definition of CSR. At the Review Meeting of the Forum in 2006, he said that “despite the fact that it has
been said many times today that there is a consensus on the definition of CSR and that this is a consensus
of the forum, really there isn’t. We mustn’t deceive ourselves about that. There is a European Commission
definition of CSR that is in its communication, which we respect, but we should also respect that there are
other views out here about the appropriateness of that definition. To say that there is a consensus where
there isn’t, I think it unhelpful.” Id.
106
Id. at 15.
107
Id. at 15.
108
Id. at 16.
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Strategy”. The European Council’s Lisbon Declaration of March 2000109 sets the goal for
the EU to become, by 2010, “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based
economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs
and greater social cohesion”.110 To help the EU achieve this rather bold objective, the
European Council suggests a fully decentralized approach in which both corporations and
civil partners would be actively involved.111 This suggestion has been interpreted by the
European Commission as “a special appeal [from the European Council] to corporations’
sense of social responsibility regarding best practices on lifelong learning, work
organization, equal opportunities and sustainable development.” The Commission sees
its CSR-policy as a means of contributing to the Lisbon goals.112
¶37
Given the integration of the EU’s CSR policy into the Lisbon Strategy, a review of
the latter clearly would have an impact on the former. Such refocusing took place in
2005 when, following recommendations from a High-Level report prepared by Wim
Kok113 and a concurring Communication from Commission President Barroso and VicePresident Verheugen,114 the Council re-launched the Lisbon Strategy with a focus on
growth and employment.115 Delivering stronger, lasting growth and creating more and
better jobs is now seen as the key to meet Europe’s wider economic, social and
environmental ambitions.116 Indeed, the revised Lisbon Strategy aims to “[embed] the
European commitment to social cohesion and the environment in the heart of the growth
process—to be a means of growth rather than a claim on it.”117
¶38
In reality, the result of the refocusing of the Lisbon Strategy is that its goal of social
cohesion -- and thus also the CSR debate -- has been made subordinate to the
achievement of economic growth and more and better jobs.118 This not only seems to
make a special CSR-aimed policy less relevant, but may also imply that CSR is only a
policy objective insofar as it does not contradict the superior aims of growth and jobs.
109

Lisbon European Council, of Mar. 23 and 24, 2000, Presidency Conclusions, available at
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00100-r1.en0.htm.
110
Id. para. 5.
111
Id. para. 8.
112
Commission Green Paper on CSR, supra note 61, para. 6 (stating that the European Union is concerned
with corporate social responsibility as it can be a positive contribution to the strategic goal decided in
Lisbon).
113
High Level Group, Facing the Challenge, The Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Employment (Nov. 2004)
available at http://ec.europa.eu/growthandjobs/pdf/kok_report_en.pdf, [hereinafter The Lisbon Strategy].
114
Communication from President Barroso and Vice-President Verheugen to the Spring European Council
– Working Together for Growth and Jobs: a New Start for the Lisbon Strategy, at 24, COM (2005) (Feb. 2,
2005).
115
Lisbon European Council, Mar. 23 and 24, 2000, Presidency Conclusions, para. 6, available at
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00100-r1.en0.htm.
116
Communication from President Barroso and Vice-President Verheugen to the Spring European Council
– Working Together for Growth and Jobs: a New Start for the Lisbon Strategy, at 7, COM (2005) (Feb. 2,
2005).
117
The Lisbon Strategy, supra note 113, at 39. In that sense aiming for growth and jobs is believed to go
hand in hand with promoting environmental and social objectives. See id. at 4, 12.
118
Interestingly, the European Parliament does not seem to accept the new focus for the Lisbon Strategy.
In its Resolution on a European Social Model for the future of September 2006, it indicates its
disagreement with the European Council and the Commission, “call[ing] on the Commission and the
Council to respect the initial equilateral triangle of the Lisbon strategy and to develop an approach that is
better balanced between economic coordination on the one hand and employment and social policy on the
other.” European Parliament Resolution on a European Social Model for the Future, 2006/340 final (Sept.
6, 2006), para. 11.
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This is problematic, since corporate responsibility should be a goal in itself; the fact that
it may bring economic benefits may act as an incentive for policymakers, but should not
be their motivation for ensuring compliance by corporations. Just as corporations should
not act responsibly merely because it will increase their profits, public authorities should
not promote responsible corporate behavior on the grounds of its economic benefits.
Respect for human rights has to be considered a priority and should not risk being
sacrificed for economic growth. Sadly, however, CSR no longer seems to be a priority
for the EU.119
E. The Commission’s Current Approach to CSR
¶39

Following the final report of the Multi-Stakeholder Forum on CSR and the review
of the Lisbon Strategy, the Commission issued its latest Communication on CSR, entitled
“Implementing the partnership for growth and jobs: making Europe a pole of excellence
on CSR.”120 The name of the document is telling: in accordance with the refocusing of
the Lisbon Strategy, the Commission sees CSR as merely a means to create growth and
jobs rather than an end in itself. Abandoning the view that CSR needs an enabling public
framework in order to be profitable for corporations, the Commission now opts for a
completely voluntary approach, believing that “an approach involving additional
obligations and administrative requirements for business risks being counter-productive
and would be contrary to the principles of better regulation.”121 It “acknowledg[es] that
enterprises are the primary actors in CSR, [and] has decided that it can best achieve its
objectives by working more closely with European business.”122 With this, the
Commission leaves behind both its mixed approach to CSR and the idea that multistakeholder involvement is essential to the promotion and development of CSR. Instead,
it chooses to favor the most powerful of stakeholders, namely business.
¶40
On the important issue of ensuring transparency and credibility of CSR practices,
for instance, the Commission admits that consumers still lack clear information on the
social and environmental performance of goods and services, including information on
the supply-chain, but sees only room for voluntary actions as a remedy.123 The
Commission thus does not conclude that the voluntary approach taken by the Forum did
not succeed in making progress on the matter and that time has come for some regulatory
intervention. Indeed, the only role the Commission sees for itself with respect to CSR is
to raise awareness in order to promote best practices124 and to support multi-stakeholder
initiatives.125 The Forum itself is to be regularly reconvened, but merely with a view to
continually reviewing progress on CSR in Europe.126
¶41
Moreover, the only follow-up to the Forum is a European Alliance on CSR, a
purely voluntary alliance of European enterprises, set up by the Communication. The
119

See De Schutter, supra note 98, at 206.
Commission Communication Implementing the Partnership for Growth and Jobs: Making Europe a
Pole of Excellence on CSR, COM (2006) 136 final (Mar. 22, 2006).
121
Id. at 2.
122
Id.
123
Id. at 7.
124
Id. at 6.
125
Id. at 7.
126
Id. at 3.
120
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Alliance will function as an umbrella for new or existing CSR policies. It is not a legal
instrument, but a purely political process to increase European corporations’ compliance
with CSR.127 The fact that there are no formal requirements for declaring support for the
Alliance, and that the European Commission will not keep a list of corporations that
support it, stresses its purely voluntary character.128 Contrary to the Multi-Stakeholder
Forum, which started with a rather broad mandate and included a variety of
stakeholders,129 the only ambition of the Alliance is to bring business together. It has
been launched as a joint initiative of the Commission and part of the business world
without even consulting other stakeholders.130 Business representatives are thereby
favored above other stakeholders and the furtherance of CSR has been entirely entrusted
to business itself.131
F. The Contrasting View of the European Parliament
¶42

It is interesting to contrast the evolution of the Commission’s CSR policy with the
view of the European Parliament. The Parliament has always been in favor of a mixed
approach to corporate human rights responsibility, combining voluntary and regulatory
mechanisms.132 It accepts that the starting point to CSR is a voluntary approach,133 and
that voluntary initiatives promoting the ‘business case’ for CSR should be preferred to
legislation as a more effective and efficient way of achieving measurable outcomes.134
Nevertheless, it considers that regulation, where appropriate, is an option.135 To start
with, the Parliament would like public authorities to create an enabling framework for
CSR. It emphasizes the importance of providing consumers and investors with credible
information on CSR practices and has asked for mandatory reporting on social and
environmental issues,136 independent verification of reports,137 the creation of a European
Monitoring Platform138 and a proposal on social labeling.139 It has also called for the use
127

Id.
Id. at 6.
129
See supra Part III.B.
130
According to the European Economic and Social Committee, the European Alliance on CSR is “of the
nature of a joint initiative on the part of the Commission and part of the business world, and . . . the other
interested parties were not consulted.” Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European
Economic and Social Committee: Implementing the Partnership for Growth and Jobs: Making Europe a
Pole of Excellence on Corporate Social Responsibility, para. 1.10, COM (2006) 136 final (Dec. 30, 2006).
131
See De Schutter, supra note 98, at 216 (noting that this perceived preference for business was a
particularly damaging political message).
132
Parliament Resolution on EU Standards for European Enterprises Operating in Developing Countries:
Towards a European Code of Conduct of 14 April 1999, 1999 O.J. (C 104) 180, Preamble, Recital F
[hereinafter Parliament Resolution on EU Standards for European Enterprises].
133
Parliament Resolution 2002/278 on the Commission Green Paper on Promoting a European Framework
for Corporate Social Responsibility (COM(2001) 366 – C5-0161/2002 – 2002/2069(COS)) of 30 May
2002, 2003 O.J. (C 187 E), Preamble, Recital J [hereinafter Parliament Resolution on the Commission
Green Paper].
134
Id. para. 2.
135
Id. Preamble, Recital J.
136
Id. para. 6.
137
Id. para. 8.
138
Parliament Resolution on EU Standards for European Enterprises, supra note 132, para. 14.
139
Parliament Resolution on the Commission Green Paper, supra note 133, para. 11.
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of advertising laws to combat false and misleading social and human rights claims.140 In
order to create incentives for corporations to behave more responsibly, it has suggested
taking corporations’ social and human rights behavior into account in public procurement
decisions.141 Finally, should this preventive, enabling framework fail, the Parliament
recognizes the need for remedial measures, and has suggested the possibility of initiating
civil liability proceedings against corporations domiciled in the EU under European
conflict of laws rules.142 The framework envisaged by the European Parliament thus
reflects our idea of an optimal corporate human rights responsibility framework, set out
above.
¶43
Unsurprisingly, the European Parliament does not approve of the current CSR
policy of the Commission and the way business has succeeded in dominating the MultiStakeholder Forum. This is shown by the Parliament’s March 13, 2007 Resolution on
corporate social responsibility: a new partnership143 adopted in response to the
Commission’s Communication. The resolution starts by stating that CSR must be linked
to the principle of corporate accountability144 and “notes the concerns expressed by some
key stakeholders about the lack of transparency and balance of the consultation procedure
undertaken before adoption.”145 While it recognizes the Commission’s definition of CSR,
it makes it clear that stakeholders have not reached a consensus on an appropriate
definition for CSR.146 Importantly, it expresses its disappointment stemming from the
lack of progress that has been made since the Green Paper, believing that the time has
come to shift emphasis from “processes” to “outcomes.”147 Indeed, while the
Commission has been busy creating “political processes” -- first the Forum and then the
Alliance -- not much has been achieved on the various elements of the Parliament’s
proposed framework on CSR. Apparently seeing no better option to further the debate, it
suggests to expand the role of the Alliance as envisaged by the Commission, adding to its
aims the identification and promotion of specific EU action and regulation to support
CSR.148
G. An Evaluation of the EU’s CSR Policy
¶44

The evolution of the EU’s CSR policy has thus, to this point, been rather
disappointing. The European Parliament has consistently supported a mixed approach to
CSR and has proposed an interesting framework which closely resembles the theoretical
framework we set out in the first part of this article. However, it has done so from the
sidelines. Although the European Commission also seemed to have rather great
ambitions in the early development of its CSR policy, it has completely dropped these
140

Id. para. 33. See also id. Preamble, Recital 12.
Parliament Resolution on EU Standards for European Enterprises, supra note 132, para. 28.
142
Parliament Resolution on the Commission Green Paper, supra note 133, para. 54. For a discussion of
the possibility to initiate civil liability proceedings against companies based in the EU for damage abroad,
see infra Pt. IV.B.1.
143
European Parliament resolution on corporate social responsibility: a new partnership of 13 March 2007
(2006/2133(INI)).
144
Id. para. 1.
145
Id. para. 2.
146
Id. paras. 3-4.
147
Id. para. 7.
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Id. para. 13.
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under the influence of business and the review of the Lisbon Strategy. Unfortunately, it
now favors a completely voluntary approach to CSR that does not suffice to ensure
corporate compliance with human rights responsibilities.
IV. DEVELOPING A EUROPEAN HYBRID FRAMEWORK FOR CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS
RESPONSIBILITY
¶45

We have now evaluated the EU’s CSR policy, as it has been developed by the
European Commission. This part of the article will take a step back and focus on the
actual development of a European hybrid framework for corporate human rights
responsibility, rather than on the EU’s policy. Indeed, although the Commission has
completely abandoned the idea of a mixed approach to CSR, there have been some
initiatives, by the EU and a number of Member States, to develop certain regulatory
elements of a CSR framework. We will evaluate these initiatives against the ideal
framework as it has been set out in Part II and assess to what extent an appropriate
framework has already been developed, by the EU and/or Member States, and which
elements are still lacking or need improvement.
¶46
First, we will address the elements of an enabling framework for CSR, aimed at
making the ‘business case’ for CSR work. Afterwards we will assess whether an
appropriate sanctions mechanism has been set in place, in case the preventive framework
fails.
A. Creating an Enabling Framework for CSR
¶47

In order to make the ‘business case’ for CSR work, public authorities have to
establish an appropriate framework. First, they have to ensure that stakeholders have
easy access to credible information on corporate human rights behavior, so that they are
able to make informed choices. The measures taken by the EU to ensure such access to
credible information will be evaluated in the first subsection of this part. Second, they
should use their own economic power to influence corporate human rights behavior,
particularly through considering human rights in public procurement decisions. The
possibilities EU law offers for doing so will be discussed in the second subsection of this
part.
1. Improve Transparency and Ensure Credibility of Corporations’ Social and Human
Rights Claims

¶48

Improving the access through credible information on corporate human rights
behavior has been recognized by the European Parliament as an important task for public
authorities in creating an enabling framework designed to make the ‘business case’ work.
This is demonstrated by the fact that the Parliament has consistently argued in favor of
more mandatory reporting, independent verification of reports and monitoring
compliance with codes of conduct.149 It has also suggested the use of misleading
advertising regulations to combat unfaithful claims.150
149

See, e.g., Parliament Resolution on EU Standards for European Enterprises, supra note 132, at para. 14;
Parliament Resolution on the Commission Green Paper, supra note 133, paras. 6, 8, 11.
150
Parliament Resolution on the Commission Green Paper, supra note 133, para. 33. See also id.
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¶49

Early on in the development of its CSR policy, the Commission also saw a role for
public authorities in improving the transparency and credibility of corporations’ human
rights claims. It stressed the need for more convergence of CSR instruments and pushed
for more monitoring of CSR commitments, even suggesting that a social label be
created.151 However, as discussed above, the EU Multi-stakeholder Forum failed to
achieve consensus on the issue,152 and the Commission later dropped the idea of
regulatory intervention, considering it counterproductive and bad for innovation.153
¶50
Nevertheless, the EU has taken some measures to ensure that stakeholders have
access to credible information on corporate human rights behavior through reporting and
through the use of laws on misleading advertising laws.
i) Measures to ensure transparency and credibility through reporting
¶51

The 2003 Accounts Modernization Directive, which amends earlier directives on
the annual and consolidated accounts of certain types of corporations, banks and other
financial institutions and insurance undertakings,154 imposes an obligation on
corporations to take non-financial matters into account in the preparation of their annual
reports. It requires all annual reports to “include at least a fair review of the development
and performance of the company’s business and of its position, together with a
description of the principal risks and uncertainties it faces.”155 The Directive points out
explicitly that “to the extent necessary for an understanding of [these elements], the
analysis shall include both financial and, where appropriate, non-financial key
performance indicators relevant to the particular business, including information relating
to environmental and employee matters.”156 When transposing the Directive into national
law, Member States may waive the obligation to provide this non-financial information
for small corporations.157
¶52
Thus, while the Directive does not impose an absolute obligation to provide nonfinancial information in all annual accounts, it does require corporations to include
information on environmental and employee matters insofar as it is necessary for a good
understanding of the company’s business development, performance or position.
Preamble, Recital 12.
151
Commission Green Paper on CSR, supra note 61, para. 66,.
152
Cf. supra Part III.C.
153
Commission Communication Implementing the Partnership for Growth and Jobs: Making Europe a
Pole of Excellence on Corporate Social Responsibility, at 2, COM (2006) 136 final (March 22, 2006).
154
Council Directive 2003/51 of June 18, 2003, Amending Directives 78/660/EEC, 83/349/EEC,
86/635/EEC and 91/674/EEC on the Annual and Consolidated Accounts of Certain Types of Companies,
Banks and Other Financial Institutions and Insurance Undertakings, 2003 O.J. (L 178) 16-22 (EC)
[hereinafter Accounts Modernization Directive].
155
Id. art. 1, para. 14 (amending Council Directive 78/660, art. 46(1)(a), based on Article 54(3)(g) of the
Treaty on the Annual Accounts of Certain Types of Companies, 1978 O.J. (L 222)). For consolidated
accounts see Accounts Modernization Directive, supra note 154, art. 2, para. 10(a) (replacing Directive
83/349, art. 36(1), Based on Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty on Consolidated Accounts, 1983 O.J. (L 193)).
156
Accounts Modernization Directive, supra note 154, art. 1, para. 14 (amending Council Directive 78/660,
art. 46(1)(b), based on Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty on the Annual Accounts of Certain Types of
Companies 1978 O.J. (L 222)). For consolidated accounts see Accounts Modernization Directive, supra
note 154, art. 2, para. 10(a) (replacing Directive 83/349, art. 36(1), based on the Article 54 (3) (g) of the
Treaty on Consolidated Accounts 1983 O.J. (L 193)).
157 Accounts Modernization Directive, supra note 154, art. 1, para. 14 (adding a fourth paragraph to
Council Directive 87/660, art. 46, 1978 O.J. (L 222)).
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However, this is only a very small step toward the mandatory disclosure of credible
information on matters of corporate social responsibility. Such a mandate would require
clearer guidance on the exact information to be disclosed, explicitly including human
rights matters. It could build on the experience of private initiatives such as the Global
Reporting Initiative, as has been suggested earlier by both the Commission and the
Parliament. Under current EU law, however, corporations only have very limited
obligations to report on their corporate human rights compliance.158
¶53
It is regrettable that the EU has not provided for mandatory reporting on social and
human rights matters.159 Although an increasing number of corporations report on a
voluntary basis, it is unrealistic to believe that soon all corporations will do so; the
‘business case’ for voluntary reporting thus does not apply consistently to all
corporations.160 The argument that mandatory reporting would stifle innovation and that
it is still too soon to adopt a specific reporting standard is exaggerated. Indeed, it seems
perfectly possible to require corporations to respect certain guidelines for their social and
human rights reporting, while avoiding overly detailed rules that may not be appropriate
for all cases. The fact that it would be more difficult and costly for small and medium
enterprises to provide comprehensive human rights reports may influence the specific
requirements imposed on them, but is not a reason per se to abandon the idea of
mandatory reporting.
ii) The use of misleading advertising laws
¶54

The use of legislation on misleading advertising and unfair commercial practices is
an interesting means of ensuring the credibility of corporations’ social claims. While not
obliging corporations to subscribe to any substantive rules, it offers the possibility of
holding them responsible for making false claims. Specifically, corporations could be
held accountable for false claims about their adherence to certain codes of conduct or
their respect for human rights.
¶55
Kasky v. Nike is a well-known example of the use of misleading advertising
regulations. In 1998, a California resident sued Nike for unfair and deceptive practices
158

However, some member states have gone further than EU law requires. The UK, Belgium and Germany,
for instance, require pension fund managers to state whether and how they take social, environmental and
ethical decisions into account in their investment decisions. See Occupational Pension Schemes
(Investment, and Assignment, Forfeiture, Bankruptcy, etc.) Amendment Regulations, 1999 S.I. 1999/1849,
reg. 11A(a) (U.K.) (amending Occupational Pension Schemes (Investment) Regulations, 1996, SI 1996
/3127 (U.K.)); Local Government Pension Scheme (Management and Investment of Funds) (Amendment)
Regulations, 1999, S.I. 1999/3259 (U.K.) (amending Local Government Pension Scheme (Management and
Investment of Funds) Regulations, 1998, S.I. 1198/1831 (U.K.)); Law concerning Supplementary Pensions
and the Fiscal Regime of Such Pensions and of certain Supplementary Benefits Concerning Social Security,
April, 28, 2003, art 42, §1 (F.R.G.); McBarnet, supra note 16, at 32. France requires disclosure of social
issues in annual reports and accounts of listed corporations. Nouvelles Régulations Economiques, Law No.
2001-240 of May 15, 2001, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France],
May 16, 2001, art. 116, p. 7776. Publication of a ‘bilan social’ providing employee-related information
about inter alia health, salaries and working conditions has been required since 1977. Decree No. 77- 1354
of December 8, 1977, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France],
December 10, 1977, p. 5751.
159
Some EU Member States, however, require reporting. See, e.g., HALINA WARD, LEGAL ISSUES IN
CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP, PREPARED FOR THE SWEDISH PARTNERSHIP FOR GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITY 3-4
(International Institute for Environment and Development) (Feb. 2003).
160
Id.
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under California’s Unfair Competition Law161 and False Advertising Law,162 claiming
Nike had made misrepresentations of its working conditions in factories overseas in
letters to newspaper editors and university presidents.163 According to Nike, its claims
were political speech and the lawsuit was therefore barred by the First Amendment. In
reversing the decisions of the California Superior Court164 and the California Court of
Appeals,165 the California Supreme Court166 qualified Nike’s statements as commercial
speech and allowed the case to proceed. Nike then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court,
which first granted certiorari, but then dismissed it as improvidently granted because of
jurisdictional problems and sent the case back to the Californian courts for further
proceedings.167 Nike and Kasky subsequently reached a settlement in September 2003168
and the merits of the case were never decided. As a result, the California Supreme
Court’s decision that Nike’s statements were commercial speech still stands and it
remains undetermined whether Nike’s public relations campaign actually infringed
California’s Unfair Competition and False Advertising Laws. Critics have attacked both
the California Supreme Court’s judgment and the Supreme Court’s refusal to decide the
issue. Perhaps surprisingly, part of the criticism was based on the potentially negative
effects of the rulings on CSR. Some critics argued that the judgments would have a
chilling effect on CSR reporting because corporations would become less transparent
about their CSR policies, fearing possible liability.169 Indeed, following California’s
Supreme Court judgment, Nike announced that “it would limit its work in corporate
accountability, not release its 2002 corporate responsibility report and restrict public
platform activities.”170 In 2005, however, Nike published its 2004 corporate social
responsibility report and made a return to transparency, finding that “the risks of any
future lawsuit were far outweighed by benefits of transparency."171 Indeed, corporations
have good business reasons for continuing to tell their side of the story, they just need to
be more careful that what they say is accurate. A potential chilling effect would in any
event be avoided if reporting on social and human rights issues were mandatory.172

161

Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq. (2003).
Id.
163
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at 3-4, Nike Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575), 2002 WL
32101098.
164
Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 854 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
165
Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 2 P.3d. 1065, 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 511 (Cal. 2000).
166
Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 296 (Cal. 2002), rehearing denied (Jul 31, 2002).
167
Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 657-658 (2003).
168
Nike agreed to contribute $1.5 million to the Fair Labor Association (FLA), which will use these funds
to focus on three primary areas: (1) improving independent monitoring in manufacturing countries, (2)
developing worker education and economic opportunity, and (3) advancing a common global standard to
measure and report on corporate responsibility performance. William Baue, The Implications of the Nike
and Kasky Settlement on CSR Reporting, Ethical Corporation (September 23, 2003), available at
http://www.ethicalcorp.com/content.asp?ContentID=1130.
169
For a discussion of the potential effects of the ruling on CSR reporting see Michele Sutton, Between a
Rock and a Hard Place: Corporate Social Responsibility and Potentially Legal Liability Under Kasky v.
Nike, 72 UMKC L. REV. 1159, 1178-1182 (2004). See also Vicky McIntyre, Note, Nike v. Kasky: Leaving
Corporate America Speechless, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1531, 1562-1565 (2004).
170
Sutton, supra note 169, at 1175 (quoting Baue, supra note 168).
171
Sarah Murray, Nike makes the step to transparency, Financial Times, Apr. 13, 2005, at 12 (quoting
Hannah Jones, Nike’s Vice-President of Corporate Responsibility).
172
Baue, supra note 168.
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¶56

The use of misleading advertisement laws against false social or environmental
commercial claims is also possible under EU law. It had been suggested by the European
Parliament173 even before the recent revision of the European advertisement rules made
their relevance to false social or human rights claims more explicit. Inaccurate or
incomplete representations by corporations about CSR or their adherence to and
compliance with voluntary codes of conduct can be attacked on the basis of the 2005
Unfair Commercial Practices Directive174 or the 2006 Directive Concerning Misleading
and Comparative Advertising.175 The former applies to unfair business-to-consumer
commercial practices and the latter aims to protect traders.176 As business-to-consumer
practices are the most relevant for us, we will focus on the Unfair Commercial Practices
Directive.177
¶57
The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (“Directive”) generally prohibits
misleading practices as unfair commercial practices, insofar as they (1) are contrary to the
requirements of professional diligence and (2) materially distort or are likely to materially
distort the average consumer’s economic behavior with regard to the product.178 The
latter means that they have to “appreciably impair the consumer’s ability to make an
informed decision, thereby causing the consumer to take a transactional decision that he
would not have taken otherwise.”179 The term ‘transactional decision’ is understood quite
broadly by the Directive to mean “any decision taken by a consumer concerning whether,
how and on what terms to purchase, make payment . . . for, retain or dispose of a product
or to exercise a contractual right in relation to the product, whether the consumer decides
to act or to refrain from acting.”180 Given the fact that a large proportion of consumers
claim to take the human rights record of corporations into account,181 it can be argued that
false commercial statements on human rights issues will indeed materially distort -- or at
least be likely to materially distort -- the consumer’s ability to make an informed
decision, and thus will fall under the general prohibition of the Directive.
¶58
According to the Directive, a commercial practice shall be regarded as misleading
“if it contains false information and is therefore untruthful or in any way . . . deceives or
is likely to deceive the average consumer, even if the information is factually correct, in
relation to one or more of [a certain list of] elements, and in either case causes or is likely
173

Parliament Resolution on the Commission Green Paper, supra note 133, para. 33 (“Calls on the
Commission to enforce strong consumer protection measures to uphold the credibility of corporate
information in relation to environmentally and socially responsible business practice, in particular applying
provisions regarding misleading advertising;”). See also id. Preamble, Recital 12.
174
Parliament Directive (EC) 2005/29, Concerning Unfair Business-to-Consumer Commercial Practices in
the Internal Market and Amending Council Directive 84/450 (EEC), Directives 97/7 (EC), 98/27 (EC) and
2002/65 (EC) of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the
European Parliament and of the Council, of 6 November 2005, sec. 1, 2006 O.J. (L 149) 22 [hereinafter
Unfair Commercial Practices Directive].
175
See generally Parliament and Council Directive 2006/114 (EC) Concerning Misleading and
Comparative Advertising (codified version), of 12 December 2006, 2006 O.J. (L 376) 21 [hereinafter
Misleading Advertising Directive].
176
Id. art. 1.
177
The provisions of the Directive had to be transposed into national law and should have entered into force
by December 12th 2007. Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, supra note 174, art. 19.
178
Id. arts. 5, 6.
179
Id. art. 2(e). This requirement reflects the fact that the scope of the Directive is limited to practices
related to a commercial transaction in relation to a product. See id. at art. 3(1).
180
Id. art. 2(k).
181
See supra Pt. II.
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to cause him to take a transactional decision that he would not have taken otherwise,”182
including the “geographical or commercial origin of the product.”183 Thus, deceptive
information about “the working conditions in which the advertised goods were produced,
or . . . the countries in which the production took place” would be prohibited.184
¶59
Another prohibited practice, insofar as it misleads or is likely to mislead the
average consumer, is the “non-compliance by a trader with commitments contained in
codes of conduct185 by which he has undertaken to be bound, where (i) the commitment is
not aspirational but firm and capable of being verified, and (ii) the trader indicates in a
commercial practice that he is bound by the code.”186 The Unfair Commercial Practices
Directive thus explicitly provides a means of ensuring that corporations comply with the
voluntary codes they have subscribed to. Finally, it is in all circumstances prohibited for
a trader (1) to claim to be a signatory to a code of conduct when he is not; (2) to claim
that a code of conduct is endorsed by a public or other body when it is not; or (3) to
display a trust mark, quality mark or equivalent without having obtained the necessary
authorization.187 The Directive thereby ensures a minimum control of the use of code of
conducts and labels in commercial statements.
¶60
On the whole, the substantive provisions of the Directive are satisfying. Subject to
reasonable interpretation by enforcement bodies, the Directive lays down effective rules
that clarify its use as a means to ensure the credibility of corporate social and human
rights statements.
¶61
As regards enforcement of the rules, the Directive gives Member States several
options. The bottom line is that persons or organizations which have, according to
national law, a legitimate interest in combating unfair commercial practices, should be
able to take action against such practices. It is up to Member States, however, to decide
on the form of such action. They can allow them to go to court and/or to bring unfair
commercial practices before an administrative authority, which must be competent either
to itself decide on complaints or to initiate appropriate legal proceedings.188 It is “for
each Member State to decide which of these facilities shall be available and whether to
enable the courts or administrative authorities to require prior recourse to other
established means of dealing with such complaints, including [proceedings before bodies
of code owners].”189
182

Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, supra note 174, at art. 6(1).
Id. at art. 6, para. 1(b). Under the Misleading Advertising Directive, information provided about the
geographical or commercial origin of a product also has to be taken into account to determine whether
advertising is misleading. Misleading Advertising Directive, supra note 175, art. 3(a).
184
See De Schutter, supra note 35, at 301.
185
According to Article 2(f) of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, “code of conduct” means “an
agreement or set of rules not imposed by law, regulation or administrative provision of a Member State
which defines the behavior of traders how undertake to be bound by the code in relation to one or more
particular commercial practices or business sectors.” Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, supra note
174, art. 2(f).
186
Id. art. 6, para. 2. The Misleading Advertising Directive in turn defines “misleading advertising” as
“any advertising which in any way, including its presentation, deceives or is likely to deceive the persons to
whom it is addressed or whom it reaches and which, by reason of its deceptive nature, is likely to affect
their economic behaviour or which, for those reasons, injures or is likely to injure a competitor.”
Misleading Advertising Directive supra note 175, art. 3(a).
187
Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, supra note 174, art. 5.
188
Id. art. 11, para. 1.
189
Id. art. 10 juncto art. 11, para. 1.
183
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¶62

However, the Directive’s sanctions for misleading practices are rather
disappointing. Member States are only obliged to allow the courts or administrative
authorities dealing with complaints to order cessation of the unfair practice, or to institute
appropriate legal proceedings for an order of cessation. If the unfair commercial practice
is imminent, courts must be able to order prohibition of the practice or institute legal
proceedings for an order of such prohibition. Besides that, Member States may give the
courts or administrative authorities the power to require publication of its decision and
the publication of a corrective statement.190 Such publication would inform consumers
that certain advertising was misleading and may have a negative impact on the image of a
corporation. It therefore encourages corporations to avoid misleading advertising.
¶63
A lot of flexibility, therefore, is left to Member States in deciding how to deal with
complaints. Indeed, enforcement mechanisms vary widely between Member States,
ranging from a state-controlled regime to self-regulation. The Nordic countries have an
efficient state-controlled enforcement system. They have instituted a consumer
ombudsman who polices advertisements and responds to complaints. This ombudsman
can issue fines or prohibit further publication of the advertisements in question. More
controversial cases are sent to the market court.191 In other countries, such as the UK,
Ireland and Belgium, enforcement is in the hands of a self-regulatory body. The
efficiency of such bodies differs greatly: whereas some operate quite well with a rather
high degree of independence from the advertising industry, others are not so independent,
do not include a wide range of stakeholders and do not even publish their decisions.192 In
any event, in practice, proceedings often take a long time, which means that decisions are
frequently reached after the advertising is already over. In such cases, publication of the
decision would be the only possible remedy. Since several countries do not allow judges
to order publication, however, corporations may get away with misleading advertising
without being effectively sanctioned.193
2. Obligate Human Rights Consideration in Public Procurement Decisions
¶64

Taking human rights into account in public procurement is another manner of
enabling the ‘business case’ for CSR to work. Such measures would enable public
authorities to use the awarding of public contracts as a means of encouraging businesses
to comply with human rights responsibilities. Attaching a certain weight to human rights
considerations seems perfectly legitimate as it would represent the collective preferences
of citizens who increasingly want to buy products from responsible corporations.194
Since public procurement is an important sector of the European Community, with
spending by public authorities accounting for 16.3% of the Community GDP,195 it may
prove to be a very efficient incentive for corporations to improve their social behavior.
190

Id. art. 11, para. 1.
See BRADFORD ROHMER, GREENWASH CONFRONTED: MISLEADING ADVERTISING REGULATION IN THE
EU AND ITS MEMBER STATES, 6, 22-23 (Friends of the Earth Europe)
http://www.foeeurope.org/corporates/pdf/greenwash_confronted.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2008).
192
Id. at 6-7, 35-40.
193
Id. at 6, 22-23.
194
Surveyed consumers apparently hold this collective preference, but, for a more nuanced discussion, see
c.f. supra Pt. II.
195
See EU Policy on Public Procurement, http://europa.eu/publicprocurement/index_en.htm, (last visited
Apr. 15, 2008).
191
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¶65

Indeed, the potential of public procurement to increase corporate human rights
compliance was recognized early on by the European Commission and Parliament, and
has also been encouraged by civil society. Already in its Green Paper, the Commission
recognized the potential of public procurement as a means of encouraging the use of
social labels.196 In their reactions to the Green Paper, several NGOs also stressed the role
of public procurement as a means to encourage responsible corporate behavior. They
asked the Commission and other EU institutions to take social and environmental
considerations into account for their own procurement and to ask Member States to do
the same.197 The European Parliament has called on the Commission to raise awareness
among public purchasers about the possibilities offered by existing Community law with
regard to the integration of social and environmental considerations into public
procurement.198 In 2001, the Commission had issued an interpretative Communication on
Community law applicable to public procurement, explaining the admittedly rather
restrictive possibilities for integrating social considerations into public procurement.199
Moreover, in its follow-up Communication to the Green Paper it suggested that EU
Member States “[make] access to public procurement conditional on adherence to and
compliance with the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, while respecting
EC international commitments.”200
¶66
The potential to consider human rights in public procurement decisions is based on
the European Directives in this area -- that seek to harmonize national laws -- and
especially the binding interpretation of these Directives by the European Court of Justice
(ECJ). Since the latest Directive on public procurement of 2004201 only partly codifies
earlier judicial interpretations of the previous Directives,202 the case-law of the ECJ
196

See Commission Green Paper on CSR, supra note 61, para. 83; see also Parliament Resolution on the
Commission Green Paper, supra note 133, para. 17.
197
BEUC, EUROPEAN CONSUMERS’ ORGANISATION, supra note 35, at 1-2; CLEAN CLOTHES CAMPAIGN,
supra note 74; TRAIDCRAFT EXCHANGE, supra note 74, at 4; OXFAM INTERNATIONAL, supra note 74, paras.
35, 40; Opinion of the Committee of the Regions on the Green Paper on Promoting a European Framework
for Corporate Social Responsibility, at 3, 7, COM (2001) 366 final (March, 14, 2002), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/soc-dial/csr/pdf/012-GOVEU_Committee-of-theRegions_EU_020327_en.pdf; SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY INTERNATIONAL, SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY
INTERNATIONAL’S COMMENTS TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S GREEN PAPER: “PROMOTING A EUROPEAN
FRAMEWORK FOR CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY” 1 (Dec. 29, 2001)
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/soc-dial/csr/pdf/031-ORGINT_SAI_INT_011229_en.pdf.
198
Parliament Resolution on the Commission Green Paper, supra note 133, para. 17. The European
Parliament had already recognized the importance of public procurement as an incentive for corporations
complying with international standards. Parliament Resolution on EU Standards for European Enterprises
Operating in Developing Countries: Towards a European Code of Conduct of 14 April 1999, 1999 O.J. (C
104), 180, para. 28.
199
Commission Interpretative Communication on the Community Law Applicable to Public Procurement
and the Possibilities for Integrating Social Considerations into Public Procurement, COM (2001) 566
final, 2001 O.J. 27-41 (Nov. 28, 2001).
200
Commission Communication concerning Corporate Social Responsibility: a Business Contribution to
Sustainable Development, at 23, COM (2002), 347 final, 23 (July 2, 2002).
201
Council Directive 2004/18 (EC), On the Coordination of Procedures for the Award of Public Work
Contracts, Public Supply Contracts and Public Service Contracts, 2004 O.J. (L 134) 114-240, Corrigendum
O.J. (L 351) 44. [hereinafter Public Procurement Directive]. For the water, energy, transport and postal
services, a separate Directive has been adopted: Council Directive 2004/17 (EC), Coordinating the
Procurement Procedures of Entities Operating in the Water, Energy, Transport and Postal Services Sectors,
2004 O.J. (L 134), 1-113, Corrigendum O.J. (L 358) 35.
202
The Public Procurement Directive aimed to codify the previous case-law of the ECJ, as can be seen in
the first Recital, according to which the Directive “is based on Court of Justice case-law, in particular case-
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remains important. For reasons of clarity, we will take the current Directive as a starting
point in explaining the role of social considerations in the award of public contracts, and
refer to relevant case-law where needed.
¶67
There are three stages in the awarding of a public contract to the most suitable
bidder. First, certain candidates may be or must be excluded from participation
according to Articles 45 and 46 of the Directive. Already at this stage, the social
behavior of a candidate -- or the lack thereof -- may be taken into account. Thus, a
candidate who has been convicted for participation in a criminal organization, corruption,
fraud or money laundering is excluded.203 More importantly, an economic operator may,
inter alia, be excluded from participation if he “has been convicted by a judgment which
has the force of res judicata in accordance with the legal provisions of the country of any
offence concerning his professional conduct”204 or if he “has been guilty of grave
professional misconduct proven by any means which the contracting authorities can
demonstrate.”205 According to the Preamble to the Directive, national law can determine
that non-compliance with environmental legislation or legislation on unlawful
agreements in public contracts are offences concerning the professional conduct of the
economic operator concerned or grave misconduct.206 It is thus for the Member States to
define these concepts in their national legislation and to determine whether noncompliance with certain social obligations constitutes grave professional misconduct.
¶68
Second, the suitability of the remaining candidates has to be checked in accordance
with the criteria of economic and financial standing and of professional and technical
knowledge or ability.207 According to the ECJ, no other criteria may be taken into
account, which means that there is no room in this particular determination for social
considerations.208
¶69
Third, all eligible offers are ranked and the most suitable candidate is awarded the
contract. At this stage, social considerations have a role to play, as ECJ case-law
demonstrates. In Beentjes,209 the ECJ was confronted with the question of whether social
considerations, specifically measures aimed at combating long-term unemployment,
could be taken into account in the award of public contracts. The Court made it clear that
there is indeed room for social considerations to be taken into account in the actual
awarding of the contract. According to the Directive, a public contract has to be awarded
either to the one offering the lowest price or to the most economically advantageous
tender.210 In order to determine the most economically advantageous tender, public
authorities may take various criteria into account, such as price, period for completion,
running costs, profitability and technical merit. As the Directive does not contain an
exhaustive list of criteria, authorities may also use other criteria as long as they are aimed
law on award criteria.” Public Procurement Directive, supra note 201, Preamble, First Recital.
203
Id. art. 45, para. 1.
204
Id. art. 45, para. 2(c).
205
Id. art. 45, para. 2(d).
206
Id. Preamble, para. 43.
207
Id. art. 44.
208
Case 31/87, Gebroeders Beentjes BV v. State of the Netherlands, 1988 E.C.R. 4635, para. 17 juncto
para. 28. Note that the use of environmental management standards may be taken into account at this stage.
See Public Procurement Directive, supra note 201, art. 48, para. 2(f).
209
Case 31/87, Gebroeders Beentjes BV, 1988 E.C.R. 4635.
210
Id. para. 18 (referring to Article 29 of the Directive applicable at the time, which corresponds to Article
53 of the Public Procurement Directive, supra note 201).
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at identifying the most economically advantageous offer,211 are given sufficient
publicity,212 and comply with all relevant provisions of Community law, such as the
principle of non-discrimination.213
¶70
The ECJ further elaborated its view on the potential for additional award criteria in
Concordia Bus.214 The case concerned the awarding of a contract for the urban bus
network of Helsinki according to the most economically advantageous offer standard,
which was to be assessed by reference to three categories of criteria: the overall price of
operation, the quality of the bus fleet, and the operator's quality and environment
management. The Court reiterated that the award criteria listed in the Directive are not
exhaustive, which means that additional criteria may be used.215 Importantly, it pointed
out that not all of the award criteria used by the contracting authority to identify the most
economically advantageous tender must necessarily be of a purely economic nature, since
factors which are not purely economic may influence the value of an offer from the point
of view of the contracting authority.216
¶71
As Article 6 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community demands that
environmental protection requirements be integrated into the definition and
implementation of Community policies and activities,217 there is clearly room for
environmental criteria when assessing the most economically advantageous offer, as long
as certain conditions are fulfilled. The additional award criteria -- in this case related to
the preservation of the environment -- must be linked to the subject-matter of the
contract, should not give the contracting authority an unrestricted freedom of choice as
regards the award of the contract, must be expressly mentioned in the contract documents
or the tender notice, and must comply with all the fundamental principles of Community
law, in particular the principle of non-discrimination.218
¶72
The possibility of taking into account environmental considerations when awarding
contracts according to the economically most advantageous tender was confirmed in EVN
AG, Wienstrom GmbHi.219 This case concerned a contract for the supply of electricity,
where the criterion that the electricity would be produced from renewable energy sources
was given a weight of forty-five percent.220 The ECJ reiterated the conditions for award
criteria laid down in Concordia Bus and pointed out that the contracting authorities are
free not only to choose the criteria for awarding the contract, but also to determine their
weight, provided that the weight enables an overall evaluation to be made of the criteria
applied in order to identify the most economically advantageous tender.221 Given that the
211

Id. para. 19.
Id. paras. 2, 31.
213
Id. paras. 20, 29-30. This has been confirmed by later case law. See generally C-225/98, Commission
v. France, 2000 E.C.R. I-7445 (concerning combating unemployment as an additional award criterion).
214
Case C-513/99, Concordia Bus Finland, 2002 E.C.R. I-07213.
215
Id. para. 54.
216
Id. para. 55.
217
Treaty Establishing the European Community, Art. 6, of 29 December 2006, 2006 O.J. (C 321 E) 37
[hereinafter EU Treaty] (“Environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and
implementation of the Community policies and activities referred to in Article 3, in particular with a view
to promoting sustainable development.”).
218
Case C-513/99, Concordia Bus Finland, at paras. 56-64.
219
Case C-448/01, EVN AG, Wienstrom GmbH v. Wienstrom GmbH, 2003 E.C.R. I-14527.
220
Id. paras. 15-18.
221
Id. paras. 34, 37-39.
212
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use of renewable energy contributes to the reduction in emissions of greenhouse gases
(one of the main causes of climate change), and considering that the EU and its Member
States have pledged to combat climate change, the Court accepted that the use of
renewable energy be used as a criterion with a forty-five percent weight.222 Insofar as all
relevant conditions are complied with, nothing seems to exclude the extension of this
case-law to the use of the human rights behavior of a company as an additional award
criterion. The fact that the Treaty on the European Union ranks fundamental rights
among the principles on which the Union is founded -- and which are considered to be
common to all Member States223 -- may provide support for that argument.224
¶73
Although the 2004 Directive was intended to include previous case-law,225 it fails to
include a reference to social or human rights considerations as additional award criteria.
In its non-exhaustive list of award criteria linked to the subject-matter of the public
contract which may be taken into account when awarding the contract to the most
economically advantageous tender, it only mentions quality, price, technical merit,
aesthetic and functional characteristics, environmental characteristics, running costs,
cost-effectiveness, after-sales service and technical assistance, delivery date and delivery
period or period of completion, and the lowest price.226 Regrettably, no criteria regarding
the social performance of the bidder are mentioned, contrary to the draft Directive, which
at the European Parliament’s insistence contained specific provisions relevant to workforce matters as part of the award criteria.227
¶74
The Directive does, however, mention social and environmental considerations as
“special conditions relating to the performance of a contract” which may be set out by the
authorities, provided that they are compatible with Community law and are indicated in
the contract notice or in the specifications.228 The Preamble mentions “compl[iance] in
substance with the provisions of the basic International Labour Organisation (ILO)
Conventions, assuming that such provisions have not been implemented in national law”
as an example of such a contractual condition.229 In principle, it would have been
possible to refer to other instruments of international human rights law as well, thus
encouraging Member States to take compliance with human rights standards into account
in awarding public contracts.230

222

Id. paras. 40-42. Austria lost the case however, because (1) the criterion was not accompanied by
requirements which permit to verify the information submitted by tenders and (2) tenders were required to
state how much electricity they could supply from renewable energy sources to a non-defined group of
consumers, and allocated the maximum number of points to whichever tender stated the highest amount,
where the supply volume was taken into account only to the extent that it exceeds the volume of
consumption expected in the context of the procurement, i.e. the criterion was not directly related to the
subject-matter of the public procurement contract. Id.
223
The first paragraph of Article 6 of the EU Treaty provides: “The Union is founded on the principles of
liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles
which are common to the Member States.” EU Treaty, supra note 217, art. 6.
224
De Schutter, supra note 35, at 311.
225
Public Procurement Directive, supra note 201, Preamble, Recital 1.
226
Id. art. 53, para. 1.
227
CHRISTOPHER BOVIS, EU PUBLIC PROCUREMENT: CASE LAW AND REGULATION 178 (Oxford University
Press, 2006).
228
Public Procurement Directive, supra note 201, art. 26.
229
Id.
230
De Schutter, supra note 35, at 312.
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¶75

When evaluating the role of social considerations in the current European public
procurement regime, one cannot but have mixed feelings. On the one hand, it is very
positive that social considerations clearly have a role to play. Case-law from the ECJ has
made it clear that public authorities may use social considerations as additional award
criteria as long as certain conditions are fulfilled. The new Public Procurement Directive
states explicitly that, subject to certain conditions, social considerations may be posited as
contractual performance conditions. Moreover, national legislation may determine that
non-compliance with certain social obligations constitutes grave professional misconduct,
thereby making it possible to exclude non-complying candidates from participation in
public contracts.
¶76
On the other hand, it is unfortunate that the new Public Procurement Directive has
not explicitly listed social considerations as an award criterion and has generally failed to
clarify their scope in public procurement. Such clarification would have encouraged
Member States to pay attention to the social and human rights record of corporations
when awarding public contracts. In practice, the public procurement policies of Member
States increasingly take social factors in account.231 However, more could be done and
the European Parliament has found it necessary to point out “that major efforts should be
undertaken by the Commission and Member State governments at national, regional and
local level to use the opportunities provided by the revision of the public procurement
Directives in 2004 to support CSR by promoting social and environmental criteria
amongst potential suppliers.”232
B. Providing for Redress and Deterrence

¶77

Even if a perfect preventive framework were in place, the occurrence of human
rights abuses can not entirely be ruled out. Therefore, it is important to have an effective
sanctions mechanism in place to redress potential human rights violations. Such a
mechanism needs to ensure that victims receive adequate reparation and that corporate
wrongdoers are held to account. It also serves to deter corporations from committing
future violations.
¶78
There are two principal ways of providing for redress and deterrence, namely civil
liability proceedings and criminal proceedings. Since each has its own advantages, an
ideal framework should provide for both. Currently, however, the European framework
fails to do so.
1. The Use of Civil Liability Proceedings

¶79

Foreign direct liability proceedings are one means for holding corporations
accountable and providing reparations for victims. The European Parliament has referred
to corporate accountability as one means of ensuring that corporations respect human
rights233 and has addressed the issue of foreign civil liability for European corporations in
231
For a very short overview see EUROPA, Employment & Social Affairs, Corporate Social
Responsibility, http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/emplweb/csrmatrix/csr_topic_allcountries_en.cfm?field=14. Examples of countries that take social criteria into account
in their public procurement policies are Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Slovenia.
232
Resolution on Corporate Social Responsibility: a New Partnership, EUR. PARL. DOC. (COM 62) para. 39
(2007).
233
Id. para. 41.
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a number of resolutions. In 1999, it made reference to the rules regarding conflict of
laws,234 and in its next resolution on CSR it pointed out “that the 1968 Brussels
Convention (now Brussels I Regulation) […] enables jurisdiction within the courts of EU
Member States for cases against corporations registered or domiciled in the EU in respect
of damage sustained in third countries.”235 It also asked “the Commission to compile a
study of the application of this extraterritoriality principle by courts in the Member States
. . . [and] call[ed] on the Member States to incorporate this extraterritoriality principle in
legislation”.236 In its latest resolution on CSR in 2007, it again explicitly pointed out the
possibilities offered by the Brussels I Regulation for bringing EU-domiciled corporations
before European courts expressing its belief “that CSR policies can be enhanced by better
awareness and implementation of existing legal instruments [and] call[ing] on the
Commission to organize and promote awareness campaigns and monitor the
implementation of the application of foreign direct liability according to the Brussels
Convention.”237
¶80
Indeed, according to European conflict of laws regulations, foreign direct liability
cases are possible in the EU. Thanks to Council Regulation 44/2001,238 better known as
the “Brussels I Regulation,” concerning the allocation of jurisdiction in civil and
commercial matters239 in the EU,240 the courts of EU Member States are competent to
adjudicate civil proceedings against corporations based in the EU for acts which have
taken place outside the EU even if the damage occurred outside the EU and the victim is
not domiciled in the EU.
¶81
The Regulation’s primary rule for allocating jurisdiction is the domicile of the
defendant, with Article 2 (1) stipulating that “persons domiciled in a Member State shall,

234
Parliament Resolution on EU Standards for European Enterprises Operating in Developing Countries:
Towards a European Code of Conduct, of 14 April 1999, Preamble, Recital 18, 1999 O.J. (C 104), 180
(“having regard to Article 220 of the EC Treaty regarding reciprocal recognition of court judgments (31
Treaty EU), the 1968 Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial
matters, usually known as the Brussels Convention, (now Brussels I Regulation).”) Rapporteur Richard
Howitt’s proposal for the resolution included a more explicit paragraph, in the operative part of the
resolution, at para. 24: “requests the European Council to confirm the interpretation in the 1968 Brussels
Convention that, for cases of basic duty of care, legal action may be taken against a company in the EU
country where its registered office is, in respect of any third country throughout the world and calls on the
Commission to study the possibility of enacting done by MNEs, thus creating a precedent for developing
customary international law in the field of corporate abuse.” Committee on Development and Cooperation,
Report on EU standards for European Enterprises operating in developing countries: towards a European
Code of Conduct, A4-0508/98, (Dec. 17, 1998), available at http://www.cleanclothes.org/codes/howit.htm.
235
Parliament Resolution on the Commission Green Paper, supra note 133, para 50.
236
Id.
237
Resolution on Corporate Social Responsibility, supra note 232, para. 37. See also id. para. 32 (“Calls on
the Commission to implement a mechanism by which victims, including third-country nationals, can seek
redress against European companies in the national courts of the Member States[.]”).
238
Council Regulation 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters, of 22 December 2000, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1-23 (EC) [hereinafter Brussels I
Regulation]. The Brussels I Regulation is the successor to the 1968 Convention on Jurisdiction and the
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters.
239
Brussels I Regulation art. 1, para. 1.
240
Council Decision 2006/325, 2006 (L 120), 22 (EC). Although the Regulation is not directly applicable
to Denmark, the country is bound by it through the Agreement between the European Community and the
Kingdom of Denmark on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters of 19 October 2005, 2005 O.J. 62-70.
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whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of that Member State.”241 The ECJ has
made clear that “although the court seized must be that of a Contracting State, that
provision does not further require that the plaintiff be domiciled in [a Member] State.”242
This means that persons domiciled in a non-Member State, i.e. the most likely victims of
abuses by multinationals overseas, may sue a company before the courts in the Member
State where the company is domiciled.243
¶82
Apart from this general rule of jurisdiction, there is also another provision which
may be of interest to plaintiffs: if a dispute arises out of the operations of a branch,
agency or establishment of a company domiciled in the EU, the parent company may also
be sued in the courts of the State where that branch, agency, or establishment is
located.244 This is so even if those acts -- e.g., the lack of supervision -- have effects
outside the state where the branch is situated.245 The added value for plaintiffs is that if a
parent company and its branch responsible for the actual damage are domiciled in
different EU countries, plaintiffs can choose whether to institute proceedings in the State
of the parent company -- on the basis of the general rule of Article 2 (1) of the Brussels I
Regulation -- or in the State of its branch. As civil procedures are different in all Member
States, with class-actions for human rights violations, for instance, being exclusive to the
UK, this extra choice of forum may in practice be very useful.
¶83
Such use of the competence of the European courts to deal with civil cases against
corporations on the basis of their being domiciled in the EU has been referred to as a
“European ‘Foreign Tort’ Claims Act,”246 making reference to the Alien Tort Claims Act
(“ATCA”) of the United States.247 Nonetheless, the mechanism provided by the Brussels
I Regulation differs from the ATCA in several ways.248 First, as opposed to ATCA, the
Brussels I Regulation does not require the plaintiff to be an alien. The domicile of the
defendant in the EU is sufficient in order to establish jurisdiction and neither the domicile
nor the nationality of the plaintiff is relevant in this respect.249 Second, the Brussels I
Regulation may be relied upon in all civil proceedings against corporations domiciled in
241

Brussels I Regulation art. 2, para. 1 (“Subject to this Regulation, persons domiciled in a Member State
shall, whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of that Member State.”). According to Article 60
para. 1 of the Brussels I Regulation, the domicile of a company or other legal person or association of
natural or legal persons, is the place where it has its (a) statutory seat, (b) central administration, or (c)
principal place of business. Id. art. 60, para. 1. If the defendant is not domiciled in a Member State, the
jurisdiction of the courts of each Member State shall, subject to Articles 22 and 23, be determined by the
law of that Member State. Brussels I Regulation art. 4, para. 1.
242
Case C-412/98, Group Josi Reinsurance Company SA v. Universal General Insurance Company
(UGIC), 2000 E.C.R. I-5925, para. 45.
243
See id. paras. 57-61.
244
Brussels I Regulation art. 5, para. 5.
245
See De Schutter, supra note 35, at 265; Geret Betlem, Transnational Litigation Against Multinational
Corporations Before Dutch Civil Courts, in LIABILITY OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW 283, at 286-288 (Menno T. Kamminga and Saman Zia-Zarifi eds, Kluwer Law
International, 2000) (referring to the findings of the ECJ in Case C-439/93, Lloyd’s Register of Shipping v.
Société Campenon Bernard, 1995 E.C.R. I-961).
246
De Schutter, supra note 35, at 265.
247
Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
248
See Jan Wouters, Leen De Smet & Cedric Ryngaert, Tort Claims Against Multinational Companies for
Foreign Human Rights Violations Committed Abroad: Lessons from the Alien Tort Claims Act?, in
GLOBALISATION AND JURISDICTION, 183-200 (P.J. Slot and M. Bulterman eds., 2004).
249
De Schutter, supra note 35, at 266. This is why he refers to the mechanism as a “Foreign” and not an
“Alien” Tort Claims Act.
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the EU. ATCA, on the other hand, can only be invoked in case of an alleged violation of
the ‘law of nations.’ The instituting of proceedings against a company domiciled in the
EU on the basis of the Brussels I Regulation does not per se determine the law applicable
to the conflict.250
¶84
Finally, the doctrine of forum non conveniens, often an important procedural hurdle
to ATCA foreign direct liability cases, will not bar adjudication under the Brussels I
Regulation. According to the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court may stay an
action brought before it if an alternative forum exists to which plaintiffs may turn that
would be more appropriate, unless substantial justice could not be done there.251 As the
general principle that defendants may be sued in the courts of the State of their domicile
is a mandatory rule wherefrom no derogation is permitted, courts in which a case is
brought on the basis of the Brussels I Regulation cannot rely on the doctrine of forum non
conveniens to decline jurisdiction. This is so even if the competing forum would be in a
non-Member State.
¶85
Such a conclusion could already be implied from the ECJ judgment in the Group
Josi Reinsurance Company SA case, which stated that the rules on jurisdiction that are
now reflected in the Brussels I Regulation are “applicable where the defendant has its
domicile or seat in a Contracting State, even if the plaintiff is domiciled in a non-member
country.”252 This was also the conclusion reached by commentators.253
¶86
The ECJ has now explicitly confirmed the non-applicability of the forum non
conveniens doctrine in the case of Andrew Owusu v. N.B. Jackson.254 In that case, the
Court began by confirming the applicability of Article 2 of the Brussels Convention in
cases where the conflict involves “relationships between the courts of a single
Contracting State and those of a non-Contracting State rather than relationships between
the courts of a number of Contracting States”.255 Once the Court came to this conclusion,
it addressed the question of the applicability of the doctrine of forum non conveniens in
such cases. First, it stressed the mandatory nature of Article 2 of the Brussels
Convention, and the fact that it can only be derogated from in the cases expressly
250

On the question of the law applicable to tort actions for human rights violations see De Schutter, supra
note 35, at 274-75.
251
See, e.g. Lubbe & Ors v. Cape plc., UKHL 41, [2000], 1 WLR 1545 (applying the classic Spiliada test).
252
Case C-412/98, Group Josi Reinsurance Company SA v. Universal General Insurance Company
(UGIC), 2000 E.C.R. I-5925, at para. 61. The Court continues: “It would be otherwise only in exceptional
cases where an express provision of the Convention provides that the application of the rule of jurisdiction
which it sets out is dependent on the plaintiff's domicile being in a Contracting State,” but the jurisdictional
rules relevant for our purposes (as referred to above) do not provide for this. Id.
253
De Schutter, supra note 35, at 271-272 (“The position thus expressed by the European Court of Justice
seems to suggest that, if it had answered either the Harrods or the Lubbe courts on the interpretation of the
1968 Brussels Convention in those cases, it would probably have found the application of the forum non
conveniens doctrine, in situations where the United Kingdom has jurisdiction based on the domicile in that
State of the defendant, to be incompatible with the requirements of the Brussels Convention, or, today, with
those of Regulation No. 44/2001.”). The Court of Appeals in Re Harrods disagreed and the House of
Lords did not need to ask for a preliminary ruling from the ECJ, since it had already decided that the
English courts had jurisdiction. See id. at 268-272 for more information on the cases. See also Halina
Ward, Securing Transnational Corporate Accountability Through National Courts: Implications and
Policy Options, 24 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 451, 461-462 (2000-2001) (stating that Group Josi
Reinsurance Company SA “spells the death of the forum non conveniens principle in foreign direct liability
cases involving dependant companies domiciled in England and Wales”).
254
Case C-281/02, Andrew Owusu v. N.B. Jackson, 2005 E.C. R. OJ C 106, available at
http://curia.europa.eu/.
255
Id. para. 35.
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provided for by the Convention. There is no such exception on the basis of the forum non
conveniens doctrine, although the question was discussed by the drafters of the Brussels
Convention.256
The ECJ next explained that application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens
would prevent the principle of legal certainty, which is one of the objectives of the
Brussels Convention, from being fully guaranteed.257 This principle requires that “a
normally well-informed defendant [be] reasonably able to foresee before which courts,
other than those of the State in which he is domiciled, he may be sued.”258 Since the
forum non conveniens doctrine allows courts a wide discretion as regards the question
whether a foreign court would be a more appropriate forum, it would undermine the
predictability of the rules of jurisdiction laid down by the Convention and thus undermine
the principle of legal certainty.259
The Court also reasoned that the application of the doctrine of forum non
conveniens would undermine the legal protection of persons established in the
Community, since defendants are generally better placed to conduct their defense before
the courts of their domicile and the forum non conveniens doctrine would not allow them
to reasonably foresee before which other court he may be sued.260 Moreover, the forum
non conveniens doctrine would also cause problems for claimants. Indeed, when
defendants consider an alternative foreign court more appropriate, it would be up to
claimants to prove that they would not be able to obtain justice there. Alternatively,
claimants would have to prove that the foreign court in fact does not have jurisdiction to
try the action, or that, in practice, they are unable to obtain effective justice before that
court.261
Finally, the forum non conveniens doctrine is only recognized by a limited number
of States, so its application would undermine the uniform application of the jurisdictional
rules of the Brussels Convention and therefore run counter to its objective of
harmonization.262
The Court then logically concluded that the Brussels Convention does not allow
courts to invoke the doctrine of forum non conveniens in order to decline their
jurisdiction based on the domicile of the defendant, even in cases where the competing
forum is that of a Non-Member State.263
The clarification by the ECJ that the issue of forum non conveniens is irrelevant if a
defendant company has its domicile in an EU Member State is important. Indeed, as a
number of UK cases have shown, corporations have systematically relied on the doctrine
of forum non conveniens as a means to stay tort proceedings by foreign claimants. At
minimum, the invocation of forum non conveniens results in lengthy proceedings. One
example is the Edward Connelly vs. RTZ Corporation case. It dealt with a UK national
who had contracted cancer of the throat, allegedly as a result of negligent exposure to
uranium dust during his work in a uranium mine in Namibia. Relying on legal aid, he
256
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brought proceedings in England against the parent company of the mining company and
another associated company, both of which were registered in England. After endless
court battles about forum non conveniens, the House of Lords agreed that “the Namibian
forum is not one in which the case can be tried more suitably for the interests of all the
parties and for the ends of justice.”264 However, the Queen’s Bench Division
subsequently held that the case was time-barred.265
¶92
Another well-known case in which the issue of forum non conveniens has been
debated at length is Lubbe & Ors v. Cape. In this case, more than 3000 South African
claimants sued Cape for damage they sustained due to their alleged exposure to asbestos
resulting from the activities of a Cape subsidiary mining company in South Africa. In
2000, after lengthy proceedings, the House of Lords allowed the case to proceed because
in South Africa:
the plaintiffs would have no means of obtaining the professional
representation and the expert evidence which would be essential if these
claims were to be justly decided. This would amount to a denial of justice.
In the special and unusual circumstances of these proceedings, lack of the
means, in South Africa, to prosecute these claims to a conclusion provides
a compelling ground, at the second stage of the Spiliada test, for refusing
to stay the proceedings here.266
¶93

A puzzling question is why, if the Brussels Regulation can be a useful tool for
European civil damages claims against European corporations for human rights abuses
abroad, have there not been more cases? One of the reasons may be that procedural laws
in Europe are less favorable than in the US. The general principle that the loser of a case
pays its own as well as the winner’s costs may raise the threshold for launching a case.267
Other reasons may be the general lack of contingency fee arrangements and the
impossibility for class actions (the UK, traditionally home to European civil liability
cases, being a notable exception to both). Of course, the lengthy duration of civil trials,
problems of evidence and lack of funding also may have an influence.
¶94
However, it may also be that it is still too soon to assess the real impact of the ECJ
ruling in the Owusu case. The UK has traditionally been the European country where
most of the civil cases against (parent) corporations have been launched by foreign
victims for damages sustained abroad. One can only assume that now that the important
procedural hurdle of forum non conveniens has been lifted by the ECJ, more suits against
corporations will be launched. A recent article in the Financial Times suggests that this is
exactly what is happening.268 One of the claims launched in the aftermath of the Owusu
judgment is a collective action brought by 12,500 Ivorians who say they were poisoned
264
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by toxic chemicals dumped by a ship chartered by Trafigura, an oil trading company, in
2006.269
2. The Use of Criminal Accountability
¶95

To this point, there have not been any EU initiatives in the field of criminal
corporate responsibility for grave human rights violations.270 Professor Olivier De
Schutter has suggested that the EU could adopt an instrument requiring its Member States
to criminalize serious corporate violations of human rights, regardless of whether those
violations are committed at home or abroad by one of their nationals or habitual
residents. EU instruments dealing with trafficking in human beings and sexual
exploitation of children, which provide for extraterritorial incrimination, could serve as a
model for such an instrument. It would also be preferable to action by individual
Member States. De Schutter argues convincingly that, if the right legal basis were found,
there would be no conceptual difficulties in adopting such an instrument.271
¶96
As for now, the only examples of criminal cases brought against corporations for
grave human rights violations are national ones. Human rights NGOs and victims
associations have tried to use the more user-friendly criminal jurisdictions of Member
States to hold multinationals accountable. These systems are, in particular, States whose
systems of criminal procedure are based on the civil law “partie civile” model. In this
model, private individuals can bring a complaint and the investigating criminal magistrate
is required to take it up. The “partie civile” model, in combination with national criminal
statutes that provide for extraterritorial jurisdiction for international crimes such as war
crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, has opened the door to some interesting
proceedings.
¶97
A well-known and disappointing example is when proceedings were launched
against Total, a French corporation, in France and Belgium by Burmese claimants.272 The
claimants in the French case alleged that Total made them engage in forced labor in the
construction of a pipeline. However, since Burmese law does not provide for jurisdiction
over forced labor, and there is not enough available information to know whether the acts
could have been seen as ‘sequestration,’ the proceedings were discontinued in 2006.
Indeed, the necessary information could only have been supplied by the claimants, which
269
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Leigh Day & Co, Press Release: Ivory Coast – Alleged Toxic Waste Claims, Feb. 2, 2007,
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Resolution on Corporate Social Responsibility, supra note 232, para. 31, 41. Although it might be
possible to read an implied reference to criminal mechanisms in the call from the European Parliament on
the Commission “to implement a mechanism by which victims, including third-country nationals, can seek
redress against European corporations in the national courts of the Member States” and its belief “that the
CSR debate must not be separated from questions of corporate accountability.”
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See De Schutter, supra note 35, 282-295, for a discussion of the possibility and the form of a European
initiative inviting the Member States to adopt certain measures to ensure that certain forms of corporate
conduct, leading to severe violations of human rights, are made punishable by criminal legislation
applicable not only in the territory of each Member State, but also to the conduct of corporations
established in a Member State, even when the conduct takes place outside the territory.
272
For background information about the case and a description of the proceedings, see generally Olivier
De Schutter, Les Affaires Total et Unocal: Complicité et Extraterritorialité dans l’Imposition aux
Entreprises d’Obligations en Matière de Droits de ‘lHomme, 52 ANNUAIRE FRANÇAIS DE DROIT
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in the meantime had reached a settlement with Total.273 Availing themselves of the thenexisting Belgian ‘universal jurisdiction law’ for international crimes, the claimants in the
Belgian case alleged that Total was guilty of crimes against humanity and complicity
with the Burmese regime in crimes against humanity. Subsequently, however, the
‘universal jurisdiction law’ was changed, and it now provides a much more limited scope
for jurisdiction. After a long jurisdictional battle between the Constitutional Court and
the Court de Cassation, the latter stopped the proceedings.274 Following injunctions by
the Minister of Defense, supplanting the Minister of Justice, the Prosecutor has twice
taken up the case again, but judicial authorities recently decided that the judgment of the
Court de Cassation was final and that the case could not go further.275
3. Civil and Criminal Accountability as Complementary Parts of an Effective Sanctions
Mechanism
¶98

Both criminal and civil accountability are valuable tools in the effort to promote
corporate social responsibility. Civil liability proceedings present some advantages over
criminal proceedings, as victims can institute proceedings without having to await action
on their behalf and the burden of proof is generally lighter than in criminal cases.
Moreover, the negative publicity generated by a civil liability case may be very
worrisome for corporations and may have a positive influence on their human rights
behavior.276 Nevertheless, sometimes criminal proceedings may be more appropriate. In
criminal cases, the state apparatus may help to fight against impunity of corporations and
ease the burden of proof imposed on victims to prove corporate misconduct.277
Moreover, victims may be better compensated when the corporation itself, rather than
one or more of its directors, is held directly accountable.278 Criminal cases may also help
to ensure that the same violation will not be repeated in the future, since sanctions may be
imposed on the corporation.279 Finally, a criminal case directed against a corporation
273

See id. at 70-71.
Id. at 68. The Court de Cassation asked the Constitutional Court for a preliminary ruling in 2004 on the
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status at the time of launching the case. The question was of particular relevance for the case, since one of
the plaintiffs had indeed obtained such refugee status as the Court de Cassation recognized on May 5, 2004.
Id. The Constitutional Court ruled that the distinction between Belgian nationals and persons having
obtained refugee status was indeed discriminatory on Apri13, 2005.. Id.
275
Id. After the judgment of the Court de Cassation the law was adapted to the ruling of the Constitutional
Court and the Minister of Defense, supplanting the Minister of Justice, ordered the Prosecutor to start
proceedings to have the 2005 judgment of the Court de Cassation retracted, on the grounds that it was
based on a no-longer existing provision. Id. On March 28, 2007, the Court de Cassation did not accept the
demand for retraction, arguing that retraction was only possible for the benefit of those who have been
negatively affected by proceedings undertaken against them and not for the benefit of the partie civile. Id.
Upon a second injunction of the Government, the case was taken up again by the Prosecutor, but recently
stopped by judicial authorities. See Joan Condijts, Les Birmans déboutés: Total l’emporte, LE SOIR, Mar.
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may generate a lot of attention from the media, thus publicly shaming the corporation in
question.
¶99
Ultimately, both civil and criminal liability could prove to be effective measures in
promoting corporate human rights compliance. Since they are complementary, an
effective sanctions mechanism should allow for both.
¶100
Unfortunately, the current EU framework regarding corporate human rights
responsibility fails to do so. It allows for civil liability proceedings against corporations
domiciled in Europe, for human rights abuses committed anywhere, but does not provide
for corporations’ criminal responsibility. An instrument concerning corporations’
criminal responsibility would be necessary to ensure an effective European sanctions
mechanism.
V. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
¶101

In an attempt to move the debate beyond the black-and-white divide between
voluntary and regulatory approaches to corporate responsibility, we have searched for an
appropriate framework for ensuring that corporations respect human rights. Our
conclusion is that such a framework must include enabling measures to make the
‘business case’ for corporate responsibility work and thereby encourage responsible
corporate behavior. In addition to such enabling measures, redress, in the form of civil
and criminal procedures, must be available for the worst cases of human rights abuses.
¶102
Unfortunately, the EU has not yet chosen to take this path, instead preferring a
purely voluntary approach in cooperation with business. The European Commission
started its CSR policy with higher ambitions and envisioned an enabling framework for
CSR. These ambitions were later abandoned, however, likely because of the dominance
of business in the Multi-Stakeholder Forum and the Lisbon Strategy review in 2005.
Calls from the European Parliament for a more comprehensive framework have not yet
succeeded
¶103
Nevertheless, some elements of a regulatory framework have been put in place.
Some progress has been made in providing consumers, investors and workers with access
to credible information about corporations’ social and human rights responsibility,
although the result is far from satisfactory. Corporations are now expected to report on
social and environmental matters, but no guidelines have been adopted. Also, the Unfair
Commercial Practices Directive may be relied on to combat false or misleading social
statements, but national enforcement systems vary widely and are not always efficient.
Unfortunately, no progress at all has been made on the issues of verification and
monitoring. Some leeway has also been given to public authorities to take human rights
into account in public procurement, which may provide an incentive for corporations to
act more responsibly.
¶104
As far as an effective sanctions mechanism is concerned, the Brussels I Regulation
is crucial in that it provides the authority to bring foreign direct liability cases against
corporations domiciled in the EU without permitting the application of the forum non
conveniens doctrine. For the time being, however, it has not often been relied on.
Moreover, all tort liability cases initiated so far have either been dismissed or have been
the object of a settlement between the parties. As regards criminal proceedings, there is
not yet an EU instrument providing for the possibility of criminal proceedings against
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corporations for grave human rights violations. There have been some cases in Member
States, but none of them has resulted in a conviction.
¶105
We cannot but therefore unfortunately conclude that the European Union’s
approach to corporate human rights responsibility has thus far largely failed. Although
some progress has been made, the approach falls far short of ensuring human rights
compliance by all corporations.
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